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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations' General Assembly in its 106th Plenary 
Meeting on 21 December 1976 adopted a Resolution (A/RES/31/169) 
designating 1979 the International Year of the Child. Among other 
things, the Resolution signified a general call on the international 
community —individual persons, associations, govermental and non-govern-
mental organisations - to re-activate their consciousness in, and efforts 
geared primarily towards enhancing the welfare and protection of children 
in all respects. Of specific concern to lawyers are those efforts targeted 
towards the promotion and implementation of ideals expressed, in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 20 December 1959, other 
declaratory standards generated under the U.N. system, and national laws 
and policies. 
The Law Society of Kenya, a statutory body corporate 
established under the The Law Society of Kenya Act (Chap. 18, Laws of 
Kenya), in furtherance of its statutory objects afore-mentioned Act, 
initiated the idea of holding a Seminar on Children and the Law through 
the Women, Children and the Law Committee under the chairpersonship of 
Ms. Grace W, Githu. Not only was this an effort to help the public in 
understanding and improving on its understanding and concern with the laws 
affecting children but also as the society's contribution to the Inter-
national Year of the Child. 
With the co-operation of the Institute for Development Studies, 
and the University of Nairobi, the Law Society of Kenya was able to organise 
the seminar in which seven (7 ) commissioned papers were presented and 
discussed. The papers covered the following areas: 
1. Marriage Break-down and the Law of Custody and Maintenance of 
Children. 
2. The Law of Inheritance and the Child 
3. The Law of Adoption 
4. Legal Aspects of Children's Homes and Institutions 
5. Law Governing the Employment of Children 
6. Juvenile Delinquency and the Law 
7. Medical and Legal Aspects of Offences Against Children. 
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These papers were written by lawyers predominantly university 
teachers and practicing advocates , a social worker and an 
academic .medical doctor. A sitting Resident Magistrate and a 
recently graduated law student also contributed. 
The seminar was held at the University of Nairobi on 13th 
and 14th July 1979 and was attended by, among others, two cabinet 
.ministers, the Vice Chancellor of the University, the Dean of the 
Faculty of Law, and the Chairman of the Law Society of Kenya. Other 
participants were drawn from .more than fifteen organisations, govern-
ment departments concerned with the protection and Welfare of the 
Children, and interested individuals :fro.m the University of Nairobi. 
This .multi-disciplinary and specialist group frankly analysed and 
discussed the papers and .made useful additional points of view, some 
of which appear in this Volume as "proceedings". 
This volume represents in independent Kenya a .maiden effort 
to review, critically, various legal regimes that affect the welfare 
and protection of children. The first and last .major effort to 
provide a wide-ranging examination of the laws affecting the status 
and role of children in society was undertaken by the colonial regime 
in 1953 when the Report of the Committee on Young Persons and Child-
ren was published. Since then, however, neither the government nor 
private efforts have undertaken such a major task. It is within 
this laisser faire atmosphere that the present contribution is to 
be .measured and evaluated. 
It ought to be axiomatic to say that any worthwhile analysis 
of laws can only be done in the context of particularised cultural 
formations within specific political-economic structures, -;Within 
the 20th Century, Kenya's political economy has elxam&ticaXXy 
changed from co.mmunial social formations based on essentially 
subsistence oriented .mode of production to a dominantly private 
property forms of ownership with an essentially capitalist .mode of 
production. This social transformation has seen the withering away 
of egalitarian social norms on the one hand and on the other the 
ascendency of individualistic norms that have greatly undermined 
the status of a large section of society with children being put 
in .most precarious positions. Most of the "rights" and "privileges" 
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that children exercise or .may enjoy are derivable from those of the 
larger society with the family being the smallest unit. The Essays 
in this Volume reflect this fact and underline the need of addressing 
the problems of Children within a whole social context. 
Of course, by their physical, .mental, and social immaturity, 
the plight of children deserve special attention and redress. One 
need not wait for the whole transformation of society inorder to 
ameliorate certain glaring injustices attendant on children. Some 
of the limitations in the papers in this volume can be ascribed to 
this concern with the obviously limited improvements so that child-
ren .may maximize their welfare and protection within the existing 
structure. As observed above, the volume represents only a .maiden 
effort and .much .more should and remains to be done even in the 
legal sphere. 
It is the hope of the organisers and participants in the 
seminar that most of the recommendations for reforms in the law and 
its administration as reflected in individual author's view points 
and in the general "proceedings" will be acted on by the Government 
on priority basis. It is only such response that will indicate 
the level of our society's commitment to the ideals put forward for 
. . ' * 
the International Year of the Child. 
An attempt has been .made in editing the papers to minimize 
as .much as possible changing the style and manner in which the 
papers were originally written. This not only helps to preserve 
the contributions and sentiments of the authors' but also provide 
diversity of opinions. There is obvious areas of over-lap in 
some of the papers and this has not been interfered with in the 
interest of emphasis and in an effort to underscore the levels of 
inter-relations and connectedness of particular legal regimes. 
The purpose would be achieved if the Volume provokes 
and influences legislators and other policy .makers and 
implementors in designing and executing improved institutional 
and other social and economic services that will primarily 
help children. 
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In closing it is necessary to record thanks for those 
who assisted in the organisation and running of the Seminar 
and in the preparation of this final collection of papers. 
Special .mention .must be made hereto*':- the law Society of 
Kenya, in particular members of its Women, Children and the 
law Committee; the University of Nairobi in particular the 
administration of the Institute for Development Studies and 
the Faculty of law. Of individuals the following deserve very 
special .mention: A.W. Wako, lee Muthoga, G.W. Githu, Chesaina 
(law Society of Kenya); Dr. S.E. Migot-Adholla, .members of the 
typing-pool and "Machine Room", Mrs. J. Muchura (Publication's 
editor) (i.D.S.); Dr. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo (Ag. Dean, Faculty of. 
Law), Messrs. A.G. Ringera, S.O. Ongondo, G.K. Kamau (Faculty 
of Law); Prof. J.M. Mungai, V.C., University of Nairobi, for 
welcoming the Minister to the Campus; Honorables Dr. Z.T. Onyonka 
M.P., Minister for Housing and Social Services, and Mr. D. Mutinda 
M.P., Minister for Information and Broad-casting; and, last but 
not least, my fellow contributors to this volume. 
Nov. 21, 1979. 
S.B.O. Gutto 
Co-convenor of the Seminar 
I.D.S., University of Nairobi. 
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MARRIAGE BREAK-DOWN AND THE LAW OF CUSTODY AND MAINTENANCE IN KENYA 
By 
S.B.O. GUTTO 
Institute for Development Studies and 
Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi 
and 
A.H. Khamati of 
Khamati Minishi and Co., Advocates 
Kakamega and Nairobi. 
I. INTRODUCTION: BASIC CONCEPTS AND SCOPE 
This paper is divided into 3 major sections. The present section 
provides a general overview of the problem as well as underlining the various 
theories, concepts, and laws governing marriage and marriage break-downs. A 
brief synopsis of what these relations are given in order that the juridical 
bases of some of the contradictions and/or inconsistencies in custody and 
maintenance laws and practice be appreciated contextually. Section 2 covers 
a textual analysis of the legislative provisions of the various statutes with 
direct relevance to custody and maintenance, including the Marriage Bill 1976, 
amended in 1979. Section 3 provides a detailed critical and analytical review 
of judicial decisions in a historical context. The last section, Section 4 
provides a brief conclusion and recommendations on the basis of the findings 
in the study. 
It is the view of the authors that matters pertaining to custody 
and maintenance of children are consequential upon a variety of incidents 
which include, inter alia divorce, nullification of a marriage, separation, 
death of one or both spouses in a marriage, or the consummation of leviratic 
unions - the latter being a customary law device for continuing or salvaging 
otherwise broken union of a husband and a wife. It is in this broader 
conceptualisation of marriage break-down that the custody and maintenance of 
children under Kenya law is discussed in this paper. 
The Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap. 144) which is the principal 
legislation on the subject of custody and maintenance anticipates this 
broader perspective of incidences preceding custody and maintenance. It 
states in Section 17: 
Where in any proceeding before any court the custody or upbringing 
of an infant, or the administration of any property belonging to or 
held on trust for an infant, or the application of the income 
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thereof, is in question, the court, in deciding that 
question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first 
and paramount consideration, and shall not take into 
consideration whether from any other point of view the 
claim of the father, or any right at common law possessed 
by the father, in respect of such custody, up-bringing, 
administration or application is superior to that of the 
.mother, or the claim of the .mother is superior to that of 
father. 
1.1 DIFFERENT MARRIAGE FORMS RECOGNISED UNDER KENYAW LAW. 
Generally legal .marriage can be contracted under:- a) the 
Marriage Act (Cap. 150) - with civil and/or Christian religions ceremonies; 
(b) Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act (Cap. 157); (c) Islamic religious 
system through Mohamedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Act, (Cap. 156) 
read in Conduction with Article 66 of the 1969 Constitution; and, (d) the 
various African customary systems. Marriage contracted under (a) and (b) 
above, are .monogamous while those -under (c) and (d), above, are potentially 
polygymous. 
The position of African customary .marriages warrants some further 
comment since there is no single legislation directly and solely concerned 
with the same and also because such .marriages have undergone considerable 
jurisprudential battery during and after the colonial administration. 
There even exist express provisions in the other legislations permitting 
"conversion" or "up-grading" of these supposedly legal African customary 
1 2 .marriages to the status of either Islamic or .monogamous Christian 
forms. 
It can be conceded that judicial opinion favourable to African 
customary law .marriages have undergone some appreciable degree of 
legitimisation since the famous negative opinion expressed by the late 
Chief Justice Hamilton in the 1910s when he said that he did"....not think 
that it can be said that the native custom approximates in any way the 
3 
legal idea of .marriage." We shall now identify the incidental statutory 
references and court decisions that have recognised and given legal 
legitimacy to .marriages contracted under African customary laws. 
1. Cap. 156, Section 6 
2. Cap. 151, Section 9 
3. Rex V. Amkeyo, (1917) K.L.R. 14. 
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The constitution which, in theory at least, embody the 
highest legal norms and standards in the state to which all laws must 
A 
conform provides general recognition to customary laws. However, 
within the very Article, it allows for. promulgation of discriminatory 
laws with respect to "adoption, marriage, divorce or other matters 
of personal laws". While differential laws may be proper in certain 
areas in plural society as that obtaining in Kenya, such provision may 
also permit prejudicial categorisation of legal standards as the ones to 
be found in the statutes that make African customary law of marriages 
subordinate to the other systems. 
The legality of African customary law marriages is recognised 
by the Judicature Act of 1967^ which provides in Section 3 (2) that the 
courts in Kenya in determining disputes brought before them: 
shall be guided by African Customary law in Civil cases in 
which one or more of the parties is subject to it ..so 
far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and 
morality or inconsistent with any written law 
j This conditional recognition of African customary laws is of 
general nature; and marriage, divorce, and other personal laws are assumed 
to be covered therewithin. 
The next statutory recognition of the legality of African 
customary marriage laws of a more specific and relevant nature is to g 
be found under Section 2 of the Magistrate's Courts Act of 1967 which 
states: "claim under customary law" means a claim concerning any of the 
following matters under African customary law:-
(a) 
(b) marriage, divorce, maintenance or dowry; 
(c) seduction or pregnancy of an unmarried women or girl; 
(d) 
(e) matters affecting status, and in particular the status of 
women, widows, and children, including guaradianship, 
custody adoption and legitimacy; 
(f) succession..... " 
The Evidence Act of 1963 in Section 130 (2)7 provides that 
marriage are recognisable: 
Whether or not monogamous, which is by law binding during the 
lifetime of both parties unless dissolved according to law, and 
includes a marriage under native or tribal custom. 
4. The Constitution of Kenya, 1969, Article 82 (4) (c) 
5. Act No. 1.6 of 1967 
6. • -Act No. 17 of 1967 
7- See also scction 127, 59 and 60 of the Act. 
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Another statute, the Marriage Act, (supra) recognises the 
legality of African customary marriage under Section 37- However,'this 
is taade superflous since Section 35 (l) and 11 (d) permit conversion 
(presumably for the "better" system) of marriages' contracted under • 
customary law and- Islamic law, respectively, to the monogamous-Christian-
cum civil type. We have already noted that Mohammedan Marriage, 
Divorce and-'Succession Act also provides for conversion of native-African 
customary - law marriages to the Islamic form. 
It becomes apparent then that marriage systems are grouped in 
a hierarchy with the monogamous systems (civil, Christian and Hindu) 
occupying the higher echelons and the potentially polygmous (islamic and 
African customary law) types filling the subrodinate positions. In the 
final count, the African customary law marriage occupy the lowest degree 
of respect under the positive law. 
- ; : -Perhaps' the area where African customary laws of marriage have 
found more clearer expression and recognition are in the courts. 
In Mwagiru v. Mumbi /=L967 7 E.A. 639-. justice Miller stated that: 
Marriage by Kikuyu custom or under the Marriage Act can result 
in perfectly valid marriage providing that there had been 
compliance with the rules which govern each form of marriage. 
In another case, in which the Judge gave other wise controversial observa-Q 
tions Justice Miller also observed that: 
It is settled law that marriage properly contracted under 
customary law are of legal effect and .matters appertaining to 
promises and preparations for such marriage are in my view 
9 cognisable by the courts depending upon the circumstances. 
It is important at this juncture to underscore the fact that, 
except for formal religious dogma, the level of social stratification 
resulting from the increasing spread and nationalisation of capitalist 
force, aided by state intervention, the differences in family institutions 
and structures anticipated by the different existing laws, are becoming less 
real. Extended family structures and patrilocality are two areas where 
major changes are taking place as relations of production upon which social 
8. See comment by 'Xamau, G.K. "Customary Marriages Between Europeans 
and Africans in Kenya", 1971 r±i E.A.h.R. 217. 
9. Case V. Ruguru (l9'70) E.A. 55. 
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relations are predicated change. The African family has been hit the 
hardest. 
1: 2 MARRIAGE BREAK-DOWNS. 
Marriage break-downs arising from civil, Hindu, and Christian 
unions (.monogamous) are not consensually decided by the parties. In 
theory only the courts may decide on their dissolution except, of course, 
in cases of death of one or both of the parties. Provisions for these 
are in the Matrimonial Cause Act (1939), a statute closely .modeled on the 
old Matrimonial Causes Act of 1939 of the United Kingdom (now repealed 
and replaced by the Divorce Reform Act, 1969, U.K., which became operative 
in 1971), the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act, and the African Christian 
Marriage and Divorce Act. 
The distinctive ideology and philosophy governing the dissolution 
of .monogamous .marriages is reflected in the heavy reliance on proof of 
matrimonial offences. This is in contrast to the doctrine of irretrievable 
break-down of .marriage where matrimonial offences are .merely of evidential 
rather than dispositive standing. The old English law upon which the 
existing Kenyan law largely drew was changed by the above reform in 1969. 
The new English law has adopted the concept of irretrievable or irrepairable 
break-down of a marriage as the only criterial for awarding divorce. The 
proposed Marriage Bill of 1976, as amended in 1979, seeks to introduce 
in the Kenyan law this .more progressive approach. In the present authors' 
view the new approach co.mes more close to the African customary principles. 
There exist well publicised differences in opinion whether or not 
there existed .marriage dissolution in traditional (i.e. pre-colonial) 
African societies event of death of one of the spouses. What is indisputable 
is the fact that there never existed rigid and inflexible rules and 
practice in the area. The ideology supporting marriage as a union .more 
of two families rather than that between two individuals was supported 
by institutional arrangements and dispute settlement .machinery that .made 
divorce extremely rare. Upon death of the husband, the practice of 
levirate unions in many societies not only lent evidence to the view of non-
dissolvability of marriages but also lends support to the notion of "family" 
.marriages as opposed to .marriage between man and wife which presupposes the 
existence of nuclear family structures. Some cases reviewed in Section 3, 
below do provide enough indication that instances of .marriage-breakdowns 
were known in African societies, at least in the 20th century. 
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At the present time .many Africans have adopted, either in 
whole or in part, legal ideology surrounding "Western type" of .marriages 
as well as those of Islamic variety. The modes of production have 
changed from those of traditional pre-capitalist societies in Kenya. 
The emergent social relations are of necessity different from those 
previously supported by the pre-capitalist relations of production. The 
present transition period is characterised by conflicting ideologies and 
practice and any form of generalisation can only be done with numerous 
caveats and caution. 
In Islamic marriages the dominant form of divorce or talaka 
is that consisting of triple repudiation of the wife by the husband. Other 
forms include the Khul in which a wife initiates the divorce by requesting 
the husband to repudiate her on condition that she pays her "freedom" fees. 
The faskh which consists of the wife petitioning the Kadthi to dissolve 
the .marriage is also practiced. 
Upon a successful .marriage breakdown the different sub-systems 
of .marriages provide for different arrangements for the custody and 
guardianship of the issues. Left alone, there is no evidence and guarantee 
that the non-judicial dissolution systems would provide adequate 
protection to the issues of the .marriages. Indeed this is becoming even 
.more uncertain given the rapid changes in family patterns and social 
obligations governing the society. It is within this underlying fact that 
the State has intervened and should intervene to integrate the law 
relating to custody and .maintenance of children. To the extent that there 
is unequal level of state intervention in supervising the assignment of 
custody and .maintenance of children, it is the purpose in this paper to 
try and show the theory and practice of what differences there are and 
the implications of these for the best interest of the children, and how 
the law ought to be .modified so as to remedy the weaknesses. 
2: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS QU CUSTODY AND MAINTENANCE. 
The various legislations on marriage already mentioned 
(excluding the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap. 152) and the Subordinate 
Courts (Separation and Maintenance) Act, (Cap. 153) .make no provision for 
custody and .maintenance is governed by provisions in the Guardianship 
of Infants Act, Matrimonial Causes Act, Subordinate Courts (Separation 
and Maintenance) Act, the Adoption Act, (Cap.143) and Children and Young 
Persons Act (Cap.l4i). Provisions of the latter two statutes are to be 
covered in the other papers and will not be reviewed herein. 
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In contrast the new bill, The Marriage Bill 1976, as amended 
in 1979 Sections 128 to 138 makes specific provision for custody and 
maintenance of children. This Bill is a consolidatory one in that it 
puts together the law relating to marriage, matrimonial causes and 
maintenance and custody of children. As will be indicated below, it 
seeks to repeal and replace all the legislations on these subjects 
except that relating to custody and maintenance-. 
A look at the relevant Key sections in the present enactments 
will give us an approximate idea of the current state of the law 
but one has to view it in the light of judicial decisions /"see, 
Section 3, Below^y7 and the general socio-economic conditions in Kenya 
to determine whether or not it is satisfactory. 
2: I Matrimonial Causes Act. 
The Matrimonial Causes Act (cap. 152) Section 2 defines "children" 
to the effect that African, Arab and Baluchi children mature at 16 years 
and 13 years according as to whether they are male or female respectively. 
All other children ( and this basically means European children) mature 
at 21 years. Section 30 of the same Act provides for the custody and 
maintenance of 'children® as defined in the Act; consequently the Act 
gives longer protection to that class or category of children who mature 
at 21 (namely the non-African non-Arab and non Baluchi children). There 
is no logical nor reasonable basis for this discriminatory provision. 
The Act does not specify the factors which may disentitle a 
spouse to custody of children but leaves this issue to what "the court 
may from time to time, either before or by or after the final decree, make 
such provision as appears just with respect to the custody, maintenance 
and education of the children the marriage of whose parents is the subject 
of the proceedings, or if it thinks fit, direct proper proceedings to be 
taken for placing the children under the protection of the court" /section 
30 (1) J 
Probably the legislature thought that this Act would be mainly 
invoked in proceedings at the High Court level where the judges are 
presumed to be competent without specific legislative guidance to know 
what is in the best interest of the children. The Act does not exclude 
the applicability of the Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap. 144) in 
proceedings under it. Hence, the conclusion is that the court shall have 
recourse to the provisions of Section 17 of Cap, 144 in deciding on the 
issue of the custody and maintenance of children. (The procedural details 
of how a spouse may proceed to court under the Matrimonial Cause Act 
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are contained in the schedule to the Act and are not part of the scope 
of this paper). 
2: 2 Subordinate Court. (Separation and Maintenance Act.) 
The subordinate Courts (Separation and Maintenance) Act (Cap. 
153) commences with a preamble which suggests that it is for the protection 
of women against their husbands. It applies in .matrimonial applications 
.made by the wife in sub-ordinate courts for separation from her husband 
and for maintenance for her and the children of the .marriage with her 
and the husband."^ 
Applications to court under this Act .may be .made by any woman 
against her husband (Sec.3). The Act does not give men equal opportunity 
under this section as it is women and not .men who may apply. But Section 
6 entitles either the husband or the wife to apply for variat on of any 
order given pursuant to an application under Section 3. 
Of direct relevance to this paper - section 3(l) (c) which 
reads: 
"Any woman .may apply to the court for an order or orders under 
this Act on any of the following grounds namely 
( ) 
(b) 
/ » 
t w^ OI'OrtC •»')'>«< • rnfiCCO 
(c) that her husband has been quilty of persistent cruelty 
to her or her children or of wilful neglect to provide 
reasonable maintenance for her or her children whom he 
is legally liable to .maintain 
Section 3 (4) provides: 
For the purposes of this Ordinance, 'children whom ' e is 
legally liable to maintain' includes, in addition to 
children of the .marriage, any child of the wife born 
before such .marriage (whether such child is legitimate 
or illegitimate) until such child attains the age of 
sixteen years or until the death of its mother, whichever 
event first occurs. 
10. See the ruling in Wasan v. Wason (1967) E.A. 682. 
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This subsection implies that such a child as is included by the 
Sub-section would be left unprotected by the law should its mother die 
before it attains 16. The Sub-section further assumes that at 16 a 
child matures and is not entitled to parental care - which is rather 
unrealistic. 
Section 4(b) provides that the court may order that: 
"the legal custody of any children of the marriage between 
the applicant and her husband while under the age of 
sixteen years be committed to the applicant". 
Section 5 deprives courts jurisdiction to make orders under 
the Act if the wife (applicant) has committed adultery unless the 
husband has condoned or connived at the adultery. This is an extension 
of the matrimonial offences doctrine used in the dissolution of .marriages. 
Where the court is requested by the husband to discharge a 
.maintenance order on grounds of the wife having adultery then, 
in the event of the order being discharged, the court .may 
.make a new order that the legal custody of the children of 
the .marriage shall continue to be committed to the wife, 
and that the husband shall pay to the wife or to any officer 
of the court or third person on her behalf such .monthly sum 
as the court considers reasonable in the circumstances of the 
case f « r th® each" such child until the child 
attains the age of sixteen years: provided that the total 
.monthly sum ordered to be paid under this paragraph shall not 
exceed four hundred shillings; and in .making such an order 
the court shall have regard primarily to the interests of 
the children S. 6(2) (ii). 
Under Section 10, an interim .maintenance order for a duration of three 
months .may be .made pending the final determination of the case. 
Section 12 of the Act gives the Attorney General as agent of the 
State authority to apply for orders for custody and .maintenance of the 
children of a .marriage where the wife is dead or, if she is alive, has 
disentitled herself to any orders under the Act by reason of her committing 
adultery. 
Section 15 purports to exclude from the protection of the Act 
children born to .marriage contracted under customary law for it reads: 
(This Ordinance shall apply only in cases where the husband and wife 
have been .married within the definition of the term ".marriage" contained 
in Section 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act.) The Section refered to defines 
.marriage as being a .monogamous union. 
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The court's authority to .make provisions for the .maintenance 
and oustody of children born of marriages contracted under customary 
law derives from the Magistrate's Court Act which empowers the Magistrate's 
courts of the 3nd class to determine all .matters relating to customary law. 
There is no provision under the Matrimonial Causes Act (which 
applies primarily in proceedings before the High Court) corresponding 
with the above .mentioned provision of the Subordinate Courts (Separation 
and Maintenance) Act at Section 12. 
In effect the two Acts by and large leave it to the spouses 
to initiate proceedings relating to the custody and maintenance of their 
children thus assuming that at least one of the spouses will be 
responsible enough to do so when the .marriage encounters problems. The 
power given to the Attorney General in the Subordinate Courts (Separation 
and Maintenance) Act, has not in the authors' knowledge ever been 
exercised by the Attorney General. It would in practice require a 
surveillence machinary within the Attorney General's Office to track down 
the cases deserving treatment under Section 12. 
2: 3 Guardianship of Infants Act. 
As mentioned above and as will be made .more clearer in the 
Court decisions discussed in Section 3, below, the Key section of this 
Act (i.e. Section 17) stipulates for the equality of rights as between 
parents towards children, gives welfare and interests of children paramount 
consideration, and rules out any other contending legal doctrine that 
may conflict with the ones in the Act. Each spouse has equal right in 
initiating court preceedings in the interests of the welfare of children 
(Section 6 and 7)• 
Third parties (viz., those who are not the parents of the children) 
.may recover any reasonable costs of upbringing of a child from its parents 
(Section 13). The Act bars the .mother of the child the right to obtain 
any .maintenance from the child's father unless she is separated from him 
(Section 7 (4)). This latter section encourages physical separation and 
makes reconcilation of the parents difficult and may be open to criticism 
as to whether this is necessarily in the interest of the .marriage or the 
children. 
Section 13 (supra.) appears to encourage "strangers" to take 
interest in the welfare of children. It is interesting to note that prior 
to the enactment of this legislation, judicial opinion in one instance 
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11 12 rejected this principle whereas in another it was favourable. 
It is important to reiterate that of all the above statutes 
analysed, it is only the Guardianship of Infants Act which is not to 
be repealed and replaced in entirety by the Marriage Bill (1976, 1979) 
13 when it ultimately becomes law. 
2: 4 Marriage Bill, 1976 ( as amended in 1979). 
Section 128 to and including 138 of the Bill reiterates most 
of the principles regarding custody and maintenance of children as is 
contained in the legistions discussed above. It defines "child" in broad 
terms to include illegitimate child of any of the parties to a marriage 
(Section 128) and stipulates that children are those below the age of 
twenty-one. There is a contradiction, however, since Section 137(l) allows 
for discontinuation of periodical payments of maintenance monies when the 
child attains the age of 18 years or marries. 
The Bill also encourages parents to separate and desist from 
residing together whenever any one of them is under a court order to pay 
maintenance for the children (Section 137(2)). It has been pointed out 
earlier that such a provision needs to be debated and its propriety 
properly determined. 
Section 128(2) reiterates but in a limited manner the provisions 
in Section 17 of the Guardianship of Infants Act. It also adopts the 
fixed-age Islamic rule and practice that a child under the age of seven 
years shall ordinarily remain in the care of his/her mother. The current 
status of practical application of this principle is provided in this 
paper in Section 3, below. 
3: JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CUSTODY AND MAINTENANCE 
From the time Kenya was a protectorate and then a colony to 
the time that she acquired the present status of a republic, there has 
been persistent inconsistency in decisions of record regarding the 
proper principles applicable in custody and maintenance cases. Historically 
several factors can be identified that may have contributed to this, viz: 
a) the existence of separate judicial systems—African and 
central within the legal system prior to 1967, 
12. 
13. 
Ole Ntutu v. Ole Sinderia (1953) 1, C.R.L.R. 8 
See section 155 and First Schedule to the Bill 
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b) the absence of a single binding substantive legislation 
prior to 1959? governing custody and maintenance of 
children 
c) the apparent neglect of proper legal research by the bench 
before ruling on cases, particularly where parties are not 
represented by advocates, and 
d) the obviously confusing cultural norms involving conflicts 
between the received law and the numerous indigeneous 
customary laws and religious rules. 
Happily in the 1970s, there began to show some consistency 
in the application of the Guardianship of Infants Act, with three principles 
emerging as dominant. These being the two principles embodied in Section 
17 of the Act regarding the paramouncy of the interest of the child, and 
the equality of rights as between mothers and fathers on claims to custody 
over children. The third principle is that a child of tender years is, 
in the absence of any negating special reasons, to be in the custody of the 
14 
.mother. In the latter case, like any other case of custody responsibility 
for provision of .material factors required for the .maintenance of the 
child is shareble by the .mother and the father. See Appendix "A" for 
the Comparison with the international legal standards"/. 
In analysing judicial decisions as a source of law and practice 
notice should be taken of the fact that numerically only a few cases 
involving issues of custody and maintenance ever reach the courts. The 
currency of extra judicial Settlement of custody and Maintenance disputes 
ought to be empirically studied and established using sociological research 
techniques. It can reasonably be hypothesised that a good number of cases 
settled out of court may not be in harmony with the letter and/or spirit 
of the law as established by statute or court decisions. The analysis 
presented here is however unfortunately limited to the few cases that have 
gone and are determined by the courts of higher categories. 
14. See for instance the ruling of Sheridan, J. - of 23 June, 1978 in 
Taabu W3o Kazungu v. Kalama, Misc. Civil Case No. 12 of 1977 (High Court) 
Unreported), and also the very able judgement of 1. Dow, D.M. Ill, in 
Wanjiku v. Hinga, Maintenance cause No. 2 of 1976, D.M.'s Court Nairobi, 
upheld by Miller, J. in Hinga v. Wanjiku, Civil Appl. No. 1977 (High Court) 
(unreported). 
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It needs to be emphasised that the absence of a binding single 
legislation on the subject of custody and .maintenance prior to 1959 was 
contemporaneous with the division of the court system into the central 
system, which adjudicated in accordance with basi-cally received criminal 
and civil laws, and the "native" court system, which adjudicated over 
civil disputes involving Africans. Appeals from decisions of the latter 
system were .made to the Court of Review which had a reporting system. 
3:1 Decisions of the Central Courts systems upto 1959. 
15 
In Abdulla Bin Mohamed v. Zuena Binti Abedi, a case involving 
native Muslims of Shafei Sect, the court in applying Mohamedan law 
observed that Mohamedan law has very strong law in favour of legitimacy 
and hence in the case where the wife had deserted her husband and ceased 
cohabitation with him for over 2g- years, within which period she got a 
child by another .man, the child was to be considered legitimate and belonging 
to the deserted husband unless he specifically disavowed it. The court 
went further, however, and denied the husband custody of the child stating 
that, "the mother under Mohamedan law has the undoubted right to the 
custody of an infant /~of about a year old, in this case""/ which it is 16 her duty to nourish". 
17 
But in Sidik s/o Mohamed v. Ima Binti Mohamed, another case 
involving Muslims, the rights of the .mother so well stated above was shown 
to be limited. The court in this case awarded custody to a paternal uncle 
of a female child of 5 on the principle that in Mohamedan law, a paternal 
uncle is the rightful natural guardian of the child and on change of do.micil 
from Mombasa to Pemba had right to take the child with him. Ehrhardt, J. 
went on to observe that "The .mother would be entitled to the custody of the 
child if the Plaintiff /""the child's paternal uncle / was returning to or 
residing in Mombasa"."'"® 
This "rights" as opposed to welfare and interest of the -child 
approach was again soon reiterated in Abubakar Bin Omar v. Mtongweni Bin 
19 Moosa. In this case a paternal -uncle to a girl child had sought guardianship 
15. (1912) 4, E.A. Protectorate L.R. 86. 
16. at 88 
17. (1915-16) 6, K.L.R. 43 
18. Ibid. 
19. (1917-18) 7, K.L.R. 43 
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and custody of his niece whose father had died and for 13years had 
stayed, together with her mother, with a stranger who had .maintained 
her. Hamilton, C.J. in awarding custody to ther paternal uncle said 
that"..o.....according to Mohamedan law a stranger who voluntarily .maintains 
and brings up an orphan child has, in the absence of any special agreement 
no claim on account of such .maintenance against the rightful guardian. 
What he has done is meritorious but will not support a claim for compensa-
20 tion. The Hon. Chief Justice was honest enough to add that the ruling 
he .made". o.. ..may seem hard, but hard cases .make bad law and the law on 
21 
the subject is clear". ' Again in Mbaruk: Bin Diwansap v. Hamsini Bin 
22 
Kimemeta , about a decade later, the High Court denied a counter-claim 
for maintenance compensation to a "stranger" who had, for over 8 years, 
taken care of a female child. In this case the child's paternal grandfather 
was awarded custody in accordance with Mohamedan law without in any way 
considering the interests and welfare of the child. 
The "hard cases make bad law" was once again encountered and 
23 
applied by the High Court in a case where Masai customary law was applied. 
In that case the plaintiff sought .maintenance and custody of his deceased 
brother' s children, widow and. cattle. The brother had died several, years 
earlier leaving his children, widow and cattle in the care of a non-Maasai 
friend who was Muslim. The widow had three additional children after 
he husband's death and all her children were brought up as muslims, The 
cattle had also .multiplied .many times. Sir Jacob Barth, C.J., however 
followed abstract "rights" approach and gave the plaintiff custody of 
the children and the cattle while expressing opinion that he was influenced 
by the fact that' "hard cft&ss bad law and that he was compelled to 
follow Maasai customary law. 
The above latter case was decided in the same year by the High 
24 
Court as Hamisi Bin_Ali v. Marjam Binti Ali. in this case, Thomas, J. 
purported to be confirming the application of English common law of 
guardianship as opposed to any other law, to all persons in Kenya. He 
dismissed the application of the paternal uncle of a young girl who was 
claiming custody from the mother of the girl on grounds that the .mother 
was of low morals and also that he had the right of custody under Islamic 
law. Justice Thomas said that,"... .upon the death of the father the .mother 
20. Ibid, at 44 
21. Ibid. 
22. (1.927-28) XI, K.l.E. 56. 
23. Arap leseret v. Ibrahim, (192.9-30) 12, K.L.R. 50. 
24. (1929 ~ 30) 1.2, K.L.R. 51. 
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has a common law right to the custody of a child of tender years as 
25 
natural guardian, unless she has forfeited it by .misconduct." It 
should be noted that apart from the rather contentious holding that English 
common law of guardianship applied to Kenya, particularly to Muslims, 2 6 
Hindus and Africans, the principle applied was quite similar to the 
Islamic laws and practice, since the judge found as fact that the .mother 
of the girl was not a common prostitute, as was alleged. 
The Court of Appeal had its share at the beginning of 1940s 
27 
when in Bibi v. Bibi and Another it reiterated that "questions of 
guardianship are to be determined according to English law". The Court 
of Appeal in this case refused to apply the alleged Mohamedan law to the 
effect that the right of a mother to the guardianship of her child, in 
this case of about 7 years old, is lost by her remarriage. The Court of 
Appeal reasoned that it would be inhuman to so deprive the .mother custody 
of her child in the absence of any "proof of unfitness" in her part. 
In the same year the Court of Appeal in rejecting an appeal 
from a decision of the Kenya High Court, on technical procedural grounds, 
refused to accept the claim of father for custody of his daughter who was 
then 12 on the ground that he had superior rights over the child's .maternal 
28 
grand-mother. The .mother of the child in this case, had died. The 
claim under Islamic law that at any rate the .mother of the child would 
only have had the right of custody until the child attained the age of 7 
was also not entertained by the Court of Appeal. 
It was already apparent by the beginning of 1940s that the 
jurisprudence of central courts was developing in favour of the interests 
of the child irrespective of the dictates of rigid personal laws. There 
was also beginning to show a tendency to bestow rights of custody of young 
children to .mothers or their female next of kin. Principles of English 
law were being used increasingly over other laws, whenever conflict of laws 
arose. Inspite of these changing judicial .moods, the decisions of the 
High Court in the 1950s showed lack of clarity and lack of unequivocality 
25. _IbijLL> a t 5 2' 
26. Mr. Gibson Kamau Kuria has challenged, in entirety, the constitu^i 
tional propriety of application of Englsih personal laws to Africans, Hindus, 
or Muslims particularly those governing custody and maintenance, see G.K. 
Kuria, "Religion, the Constitution and Eamily Law and Succession in Kenya"1, 
paper prepared for Faculty of Law Seminar, October 28, 1977, at pp.82-84. 
27. 8, E.A.L.R. 200 (C.A.) 
28. (1941) 8, E.A.C.A. 12. 
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in the principles as shown in the following two decisions„ 
29 
In Krishan v, Kumari, ' where the High Court decided mainly 
on preliminary points of law rather than on merits of the case, the court 
made several observations. Of relevance here were the observations that: 
neither the Custody of children Act, 1891 (u.k.) nor the Guardianship 
of Infacts Acts, 1868 and 1925 (U.K.).') were statutes of general application 
to Kenya ~ thus implying that only English customary (common) law .may have 
been received in Kenya; neither the Hindu Marriage, Divorce and Succession 
Act (Cap. 149) nor the Custody of Children Ordinance, 1926 (Kenya) 
provided substantive law on custody, and; in Kenya, the "general" law— 
implying common law-—-was applicable. After stating the traditional 
common iaw position to the effect that"..,.a father has a natural juris-
diction over the infant's welfare and a right to the custody of his chil'd 
during infancy", /^and that this^7"........ a right exists even against 
th® mother"1,"^the court declined to rule in favour of the father. In effect 
then, the court accepted the Islamic practice which generally favours 
mothers regarding custody of children of tender years. The contradictions 
in the court's jurisprudence is however apparent in this case. 
A few years before the enactment of the Guardianship of Infants 
Act, the High Court made a ruling purporting to apply the harsh English 
common law—which some commentator has asserted to be in concert with 
Kikuyu custody law 1 __ with the effect that a paternal 
uncle was awarded custody of a 4 year -old female child in an admitted 
contravention of canons of justice which may have dictated that the child 
be left in custody of "a strange" Nandi woman who had taken very able care 
of the child. Miler, C»J. categorically stated that: 
if it were merely a question of weighing the comparative 
advantages to the child the scales would, co.me down heavily on 
the side of the respondent, / "stranger!1 /, but, as I have said, 
it is contended that the applicant in this case has rights which 
cannot be override..»,^ 
The Judge went on to assert that in English law 
the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration 
as between parents inter se or between strangers inter se. As be-
tween a parent and a stranger, however, the parent has a right 
which has been subject of judicial definition more than once.' " 
29 o (1955) 26, K.L.R. 32, 
30. Ibid; at 36 
31« See, Kamau Kuria, op.cit. at 82 
32. In Re G.M, (An Infant) /^l957_7 E.A. 714, at 715. 
33o" Ibid. 
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3: 2 Decisions of the Court of Review (for Africans) 1951-1959. 
34 
In Nyabeir v. ITyaboga, the court of Review stated the general 
rule of Gusii customary law to the effect that in question of custody, 
where a woman is .married and not divorced but separates from the husband 
without his consent and irregularly "re-marries" and begets children in 
the new union, all the children of the regular and the irregular union 
"belong" to the legal husband. However, in the present case the court 
refused to award custody of the children of the "irregular" union to the 
legal husband on the basis of "natural justice" since it found as fact that 
the woman concerned had unsuccessfully demanded divorce from the legal 
0 husband. It seeas that the court was concerned more with the determination 
of "right of possession" of the parties rather than the welfare of the 
children concerned. 
In the same year, the Court ruled that although the Maasai law, 
which it applied, dictated that a legal husband has rights of custody of 
children conceived and born to his deserting wife during an "irregular" 
union, the putative father of such children was entitled to recoup the 
35 .maintenance .monies spent on such children. 
Two years later the Court of Review was invoked to decide a case 
of custody in which a Gusii woman had deserted her legal husband and 
during that period she conceived and gave birth to two children, one with 
unknown father and another with an identified lover who wished to .marry her 
and she him. The court ruled that the legal husband had the right of 
custody of the child with the an unidentified father. The court here refused 
to follow the ruling in Nyaberi1s case on the ground that the latter was 
decided "upon facts of the particular case". It stated: 
The customary law on this subject is clear and long-established, 
namely, that the children of any irregular -union between the 
wife and a .man other than the husband, as well as the children 
of the .marriage, belong to the husband of the regular union.36 
The court, however, gave custody of the second child the woman had with the 
identified lover to the woman because he wanted to .marry the lover and also 
because "natural justice demands that she should keep the custody of that 
37 child". 
34. (1953) I.C.R.I.R. 5. 
35. Ole IT tutu v. Ole Sinderia, (1953) 1, C.R.I.R.8 
36. Nyandiko v. Kerubo D/O Motanya, (1955) 3 C.R.l.R. 2,at P.2 
37. Ibid, at p.
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In the same year the Court followed "with some hesitation 
and reluctance", its ruling in the above case as regards the child born 
to the woman with the identified lover whom she wanted to .marry, Ochero 7Q 
-P/O „0igo v. Mogoi Here, the woman had a child with her husband before 
he died leaving her to be "inherited" through a leviratic union to the 
deceased husband's brother. She was so "inherited" against her will and 
she deserted and had a second child with a lover she wanted to marry. Her 
father also consented to refunding the bride price to the levir so that 
she could marry the new lover. The court gave custody of her first child 
to the levir and the second to her. This was again a compromise solution 
not based entirely on consideration of the interest of the children 
concerned. 
Again in Moraa P/O Qbare v. Uyakong'o' a mother was given custody 
of her 3 children born in an irregular .marriage that she entered into 
while her first .marriage was still legal and subsisting. She could not 
get a child in the first marriage and, although technically in G-usii 
customary law as then established by the court any issues would have 
"belonged" to the first husband, she had wanted to stay with her second 
"husband". The court ruled that "principles of natural justice" dictated 
that she keep custody of her children. 
The second half of 1950s saw a wave of cases coming before the 
court in which the real .motive of the legal husbands was not so .much demand 
for custody and assumption of responsibility for .maintenance of the children 
born to their wives but which they did not father but rather anticipated 
.material benefits that would accrue once the children were married, in 
case of female children. 
40 
_Saitenui v. Maiba , a case involving the Taveta, set the trend 
in this direction. Here the legal husband had paid only "trivial bride 
price" and had a child with his wife. The wife then deserted and lived 
with another .man. They had , children in this irregular union. After about 
7 years of desertion the legal husband filed a successful petition for 
custody of children of the irregular union. He never sought for enforcement 
of the order.Si* y&ar8 later,about 13 years after the wife had deserted, 
he took a court action demanding custody of all the children. The court 
38. 
39. 
40. 
(1955) 3 C.R.I.R. 4. 
(1955) 3 C.R.L.R. 10 
(1956) 4 C.R.I.R. 5 
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however reasoned, rather incorrectly, that the legal husband had 
"forfeited his rights when he failed to complete the intial bride 
price," .Failure to complete bride price is not a ground for vitiating a 
marriage under African customary law»^' 
42 
Onchoke v. Kerebi d/o Ondieki, a case from. Kisii followed closely on 
the nyayos of S'aitemu t, Maiba (supra). In the former case, a wife 
deserted her husband before she had any child with him and for 13 uninteru-
pted years she lived an adulterous life from which she had 6 children 3 
dead and 3 surviving. Her lover with whom she had the children wanted 
to marry her and the custody of the children. The court, in awarding her 
and her lover custody of the children noted that her legal, husband's 
intention was the potential receipt of bride-price from marriage of the 
children. It stated; "strictly according to customary law the applicant / 
husband / has a claim to the respondent's illegitimate children,", 
however, given the circumstances of the case," natural, justice demands 
that /the putative father_7 should be allowed to keep the children, of 4-3 which he is admittedly the father". The Court went on to observe that 
"the conduct of the applicant amounts to an abuse of the customary law and 
44 
is repugnant to natural justice", That is, his indifference to the 
adulterous union of his wife and lack, of concern for the welfare of "his" 
children. 
.-.. 45 In Maivura v. Anginda, another case from Kisii, the issue 
was whether a legal husband - having married the wife under the African 
Christian and Divorce Ordinance - had the right of custody of children born 
to his deserting wife in a purported customary marriage entered into by 
the wife 17 years earlier. The wife had deserted and had one illegitimate 
child and then purported to marry someone else under customary law and had 
8 more children. Evidence was given that in the interim period when the 
wife had only 3 children the husband had successfully applied for custody 
but did not seek enforcement of this order for several years. Taking 
judicial notice of the inaction on part of the legal, husband in seeking 
execution of the earlier order and also finding as fact that his real 
interest was in the dowry to be paid on marriage of the children, the court 
awarded custody to the wife. The wife was not condemned by the court for 
contracting the illegal "second" marriage as the husband himself had 
illegally "married" another 3 wives. Natural law was used to justify the 
41. See the Magistrate's ruling in Wanjiku v. Hinga, footnote 14, above. 
42. (1958) 6, C.E.L.E. 2. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., p.3 
45. U958) 6 C.E.L.R. 4 
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court decision. It ought to be noted here that such double-decker 
marriage were and are still common in Kenya. 
The Court of Review by "959 .moved along from the strict "right 
of possession" approach in setting custody issues and started looking at 
46 
the interest of the children. In Kadogo v.Gohu , a case involving the 
Giriama, a paternal uncle sought custody of 4 children of his deceased 
brother. His brother's widow, the .mother of the children, however preferred 
to stay with and be .maintained by the deceased husband's friend who had 
earlier .maintained her husband as a chiid and had helped in the marriage. 
In a 3 to 1 decision the Court ruled that although the children's paternal 
uncle had the customary right to them, it was necessary for the children 
to remain with their mother who had decided to remain with the .man who was 
Maintaining her « "having regard to their ages" and that the wishes of the 
.mother was to be taken into account. R.M. Sundor (dissenting) contended 
that on a point of law it was the paternal uncle who had the right of 
custody although the .mother was free to .make a choice of who to live with. 
This case is important for its recognition of the interests of the .mother 
as well as the welfare of the children. 
3: 3 Decisions of the Central Courts: 1959-1967. 
1959 saw the introduction of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 
with its Section 17 (supra.) setting the principles of general application 
in custody and .maintenance issues in Kenya. Mere legislating on an issue 
however does not guarantee an instant or even a uniform conformity with the 
new desired goals. This is clearly demonstrated in the practice of the 
Courts with respect to issues of custody and .maintenance since 1959. 
Between 1959 and 1967 when the court structure became unified, 
the Central Court system gave one reported .major ruling which relied 
squarely on and applied principles of the new legislation. This was in 
47 
Bazmi v. Sultana. The issues here were first, whether Mohamedan law or-
the Guardianship of infants Act applied to questions of custody and 
.maintenance of a child born to separated parents who professed Islamic 
religion and belonged to the Hanafi sect and, secondly, if the latter 
statute was applicable, whether the father was entitled to custody of a 
child whom he had been in custody of for a period of 3sryears. Expert 
evidence established that the child had stayed very happily with the father 
46. 
47. 
(1959) 6 C.R.L.R. 8 
/"1960~7 E.A. 801 (C.A.). 
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for 3sr years although it could be expected to cover from the def jjx-ute 
disturbance it was going to suffer were the .mother to be given custody. 
The Court of Appeal, in affirming the decision of the High Court ruled 
that in all .matters of custody the Guardianship of Infants Act applied. 
In its languages 
....that Ordinance / Act / applies with full force to Mohamedan, 
not less than to other, infants, and, under S.17, the welfare of 
the infant and not the right under Mohamedan law of either 
parents is a paramount consideration in deciding questions of 
4. * 48 custody. 
The Court of Appeal went even further to eliminate all reminants of Islamic 
rules and practice by ordering the deletion of that part of the High Court 
ruling that had stated that the .mother was to take custody of the child only 
until such child attained the age of 7 years after which the father would 
presumably assume custody of the child. The Court of Appeal ordered,.in 
accordance with provisions of the Act, that either party was entitled to 
apply for revision of the order. 
A rather disturbing part of the Court of Appeal's decision was 
that which insisted that the .mother was better placed than the father in ,, 
having custody of the child although expert evidence established that the 
child had lived very happily with the father for 3s>-years of its infancy 
and that it would suffer, albeit briefly, when separated from the father. 
This rather unfortunate patriarchal prejudice which tends to perpetuate the 
.myth that .mothers are inherently better than fathers when it comes to 
bringing up of children has led to the now established rule that children 
of tender years are best left with the .mothers. Such unscientific prejudice 
has very devastating implications for the role of women in society. 
Ellaboration of this point would, however, go outside the scope of this 
paper. 
3: 4 Decisions of the Court of Review (for Africans) Post 1959. • 
The Court of Review gave custody to a mother of her 3 living 
adulterines she had .mothered with an unspecified lover while staying with 
49 
her brother, 01 e Kamairo v. Ole Pardiyo. She had earlier .married and 
deserted her husband from whom she had no child. The husband however, after 
about 14 years of separation, claimed the custody and .maintenance of his 
wife and children. Prom the cases in Section 3.2 above, it is clear that 
48. Ibid, at p. 807, per Grawshaw, J.A. 
49. (1961) 9, C.R.I.R. 7. 
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the decision in this case was typical of the others. It .made no 
reference to the hew legislation which was by now binding on all 
the courts. 
The Court of Review however adopted the spirit of and .made an 
50 
indirect reference to the new legislation in 01enja_v. Kenya, as case 
involving luhyas. The parties in this case were .married in accordance 
with Christian rites although dowry was paid to the woman's parents as 
in the common practice. Before the wife had deserted there were two 
issues of the .marriage and one had died. The wife then deserted and no 
return of dowry was demanded. The wife had 3 more adulterine children, 
2 boys and a girl. The husband demanded, according to the luhya customary 
law of his location, custody of the girl child out of the 3 adulterines. 
The Court stated the applicable customary law to the effect that: 
....a male child born as a result of a wife's adultery is 
deemed to be the lawful child of the adulterer, whereas 
a female child is deemed to be the lawful child of the 
husband. 
However, the Court decided that customary law .must be .modified so that 
they .must "consider the interests of the child concerned". The Judges 
continued: 
....we do not think it is in the interest of that child, 
which in •notHAr-:1 jurisdiction /^i.e. Central Courts~~7 are 
regarded as paramount, that she should now be removed from 
the care of her .mother and the company of her tffio brothers, 
as-well as her elder sister, the respondent's / legal father's / 
daughter, and compelled to live with the respondent.51 
The Court then awarded "legal custody" of the girl to the father and 
"physical custody" to the .mother on condition that the father would only 
reap the brideprice of the "daughter" if he paid .maintenance for the child. 
Maintenance was here conceived to include school fees, uniforms, and all 
other expenses connected with the child's education. 
3: 5 Decisions of the Unified Court system 1967 to the Present. 
The integration of the Court system in Kenya in 1967 by the 
enactment of the Judicature Act (supra,) should be conceived .more as 
involving institutional structural reform rather than one entailing the 
unification and generalisation of substantive laws. A reading of Article 
82 of the Constitution, Section 3 of the Judicature Act, Section 2 of 
the Magistrate's Courts Act, and the Kadhi's Courts Act (1967), among 
50. 
51. 
(1962) 10, C.R.L.R. 8. 
Ibid. 
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others, clearly shows the continuity of legalised application of multiple 
personal laws within the Kenyan Courts. It is outside the scope of this 
paper to expand on this point, interesting as it may be. 
We have already noted in the preceding sections that both the 
Central Courts system and the African Court system had, starting in 1959, 
adopted either in full or in part the provisions in the Guardianship of 
52 
Infants Act. The fact that in Karuru v. Njeri the High Court completely 
disregarded the case law as well as the existence of the legislation 
cannot be over emphasised. The parties were .married under Kikuyu customary 
law and the parties were divorced although the return of the bride-price 
was never demanded nor affected. There were 4 issues of the .marriage,. 
Prior to the unification of the court system the wife had successfully 
applied for divorce in the African Court. A fresh application seem to have 
been lodged in the Magistrate's Court who had given the woman custody 
of 2 elder children and the .man 2 younger children. An appeal was .made 
against this order in the High Court. Neither party was represented by 
an advocate. Simpson, J. after starting the applicable customary law that: 
...on divorce the children go to the father -unless the father 
demands the return of the bride-price in which case they go to 
the mother provided the bride-price is returned in full." 
and went on to assert, quite surprisingly, that this customary law which 
denied women any claim to custody of the children on return of the bride 
price was not contrary to Sec. 3(2) of the Judicature Act which gave 
authority for the use of natural law or justice to overide or .modify 
customary law. This by itself was a significant departure from most of the 
decisions already reviewed herein. But the Hon. Justice went farther. He 
correctly noted that the "paramount consideration in custody matters is 
the welfare of the child" but then stack to the rigid customary law even 
though he noted that this would cause "emotion disturbance" to the children 
as well as "possible interruption of their education". Because of apparent 
luck of reasonable homework and the absence of legal representatives, the 
Hon, Justice declared not only that the stated customary law was not 
repugnant to justice but also that it was not inconsistent with any 
written lawI Had the Judge's attention been drawn to Sec.17 of the legis-
lation he .may have had a different opinion. It has been noted by the 
East African Law Reports that the ruling was indeed inconsistent with the 
said section, and E. Contran (now Justice of the High Court) also noted 
52. A~1968T7 E.A. 361. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Lbicb > "Editorial Note. 
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55 that the case was decided per incuriam. The Justice however went even 
farther. He declared with rather unfortunate disregard for personal 
freedom and dignity of the woman that she did "have a remedy if she 
56 
chooses. She is free to accept the applicant's offer to take her back" 
perhaps as his slave ? 
No wonder then that two years later the High Court noted some 
of the inconsistency in the above ruling and refused to follow it. In 
57 
Wambwa v. Okumu, Mosdell, J. declined to follow the ruling of Justice 
Simpson by stating that the "decision I suspect was reached per incuriam 
as the case was not argued by counsel^? The issue here was whether, as was 
the position in Bagishu (luhyia) customary law, a father of an illegitimate 
child was entitled to the custody of-Such child in preference to the .mother 
of the child and the .mother's father with whom she was staying. The Court 
categorically declared that the Bagishu customary law as stated was contrary 
to Section 17 of the Guardianship on Infants Act, that therefore it was 
inconsistent with a written law as provided for under Section 3 (2) of 
the Judicature Act and, lastly, that "in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances,, the welfare of a female infant aged four years.. demands 
that the infant be looked after by its mother rather than its putative 
father",.59 
In Nzoka v. Mwikali d/o Mule 6 0 the High Court (per Justice 
Chanan Singh) rejected the stated Kamba customary law which decrees that 
on divorce, custody of children of a .marriage is at the"wishes of the 
husband". This was found to be in conflict with the G-uardianship of Infants 
Acts, section 6,7 and 17. The Court stated that these sections were 
unambigous and that "an unambigous statutory provision which covers 
61 
circumstances of acase always oversides custom". In this case the issue 
was really not that of custody since the wife was already having custody 
of the children but rather that of .maintenance for the wife and the children 
of the dissolved .marriage. The court rejected the wife's claims for 
.maintenance for her self while accepting that for the children. 
55. 0oatx®i3» 1, ^Custody of Children Under Customary Law", (1968), 
E„A.L.J. vol. IV, No.3, 153-154. 
56. Supra., at 362. 
57. /~1970~7 E.A. 578. 
58. Ibid, at 579. 
59: Ibid. 
60. (1971) K.H.C.D. 79 
61. Ibid., at 80. 
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In Mohamed v. Yasmin a marriage agreement between the wife 
and the husband stipulated, inter alia, that in the event of disputes 
arising with regard to custody of the issues of the marriage, the Shia 
Imami Ismailia Provincial Council was to be the forum for decision. The 
High Court rejected this and declared that in all custody and .maintenance 
disputes, the High Court had overiding jurisdiction over any other fora. 
The Court of Appeal upheld this decision and specifically ruled (with one 
dissenting opinion) that matters involving custody cannot properly be the 
subject of arbitration under the Arbitration Act (Cap.49). The Court of 
Appeal conceded that "indeed any other body or person, can act between the 
father and .mother and with their consent endeavour to arrive at an amicable 
r 
settlement of the dispute" , but this can not exclude the jurisdiction of 
the High Court. The High Court .may give full consideration to any views 
or principles of any religious body but .must act within Section 17 of the 
G.I, Act which .makes the first and paramount consideration the welfare of 
64 the child. 
The principle of paramouncy of the child's welfare and also the 
presumption in favour of .mothers for custody of younger children was applied 
65 
by the Court of Appeal once more in Karanu v. Karanu. Here the parties had 
.married in accordance with Church rites and had 2 issues aged 7 and 6 years. 
They were separated and divorce proceedings were pending in the Courts. The 
Court of Appeal in a -unanimous decision approved and applied Warnbwa v. Okumu 
(supra.) and stated that welfare of the children was of paramount 
consideration. Since both the father and .mother were working, the children 
sickly, and the .mother had an ayah for them, the children needed constant 
care and attention, which the court had "no doubt" they are .more likely to 6 6 
get from their .mother than their father". Earlier on in the decision the 
Court observed that it is a "generally accepted rule that, in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, the custody of young children should be given r-7 
to the .mother," As usual, the father was given the right of access to 
see the children. 
62. /jL973_/ E.A. 533 (C.A). 
63. Per Sir William Duffus, P. at 536. 
64. Ibid, at 537-
65. /J-97.L7 E.A. 18 (C.A.). 
a t P-20* 
67. Ibid, at p. 19. 
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In Wanjiku v. Hinga, endorsed by the High Court in Hinga v. 
fi R 
ffanjiku, the District Magistrate ruled that where a mother is given 
custody of children, the father is under a duty of .maintaining the 
children, and that where a father appears hostile to the children, the 
custody should be given to the mother. The only criticism of this 
decision is that the learned Magistrate committed all the children, 5 of them, 
the eldest being only 11 years old, to the mother until each attains the 
age of 16. Usually the law requires that orders of Custody are revisable 
at instance of either party although one .may agree with the Magistrate's 
sentiments since the father had attempted to assert, that the children 
were his. 
69 
Lastly, in Taabu Kazungu v. Kalama, a case decided by the 
High Court last year, Justice Sheridan noted that even in customary law 
disputes — in this case Giriama the mother of the 
children forming the subject of the dispute ought to be made parties to 
the suit so as to .meet the requirements for fair trial within the meaning 
of Article 77 (9) of the Constitution. In rejecting a claim by a father 
that under Giriama customary law, the father alone is entitled to custody 
of the children except the very young ones, the Court specifically ruled 
that the said customary law" is repugnant to justice and .morality 
and inconsistent with the written law contained in the Guardianship of 
Infants Act (Cap.144) within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Judicature 
Act (Cap.8) and should not be enforced". It also observed that: "it is 
the generally accepted law that the interests and welfare of the children 
are the paramount consideration and that it is natural for a young child, 
particularly a girl, to remain with her .mother during the formative years". 
The second part of the Hon. Judge's ruling may, of course, be open to 
criticism from sex equalitarians and some radical child and education 
psychologists. 
68. 
69. 
See footnote 14, above. 
Ibid. 
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4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Various conclusions have been reached in the main body of the 
paper and there is no intention to repeat them here. A general summary 
will suffice in conclusion. 
Both in legislative and judicial opinion development there is a 
definite bias towards making the interest and welfare of children factors 
of paramount consideration in making custody and maintenance orders. There 
is a limit to which such position can be, in practice, universalised since 
only a few disputes reach the courts, especially the higher courts. Even 
where cases reach the Courts not all the Courts are properly educated in the 
law to be able to apply the proper principles unless assisted by advocates. 
This trend is true also of the implementation of the concept of equality 
between men and women. There is still a tendency in the Courts to take "rights" 
approach at the expense of the welfare of the children. This will not be aided 
amelioratively by provisions of Section 128 of the Marriage Bill. 
Another principle which has gained legitimacy in practice and is 
even stipulated in the Marriage Bill is that favouring mothers with the 
custody of children of tender ages. This tends to institutionalise and per-
petuate the image of women as "child bearers" and fails to take adequate 
changes in family relations particularly among the "working class" and 
above. 
The law as it stands on paper provide the state with sufficient 
room for intervention in order to ensure that children get the best whenever 
there is marriage breakdowns but this role is unfortunately not played by 
the state. There is therefore need for studies to be initiated which may 
determine not only to what extent the state should intervene in the interests 
of the children in all disputes on custody and maintenance but also to 
determine what the extra-judicial practices may be. It is quite clear that 
even in Courts wards for custody are not usually followed by maintenance 
orders. 
On the basis of the foregoing conclusions and the wider analysis 
in the paper the following recommendations are proper. There are not in any-
way to be considered as comprehensive. 
- 32 IDS/OP 35 
4:1 Recommendations. 
A) That cheap procedures for custody and maintenance should 
exist to be invoked by mothers and fathers alike whatever 
the form of .marriage. 
B) That adultery of .mothers .may not solely form a ground for 
disentitlement of the children to maintenance orders, although 
these may determine whether or not custody should be given to 
the mothers or not. At any rate whatever rules are preferred 
should apply both to .mothers and fathers. 
c) Maintenance orders should co.mpulsorily accompany custody orders. 
D) An independent judicial body with active surveillance powers 
should be formed to track down cases of default in maintenance 
payments, and to deal exclusively with cases of custody and 
maintenance. It should ensure that no marriage break-downs 
.may occur without proper intervention to ensure that custody 
and maintenance arrangements conform with the law. 
E) The presumption that mothers are better left with custody of 
children of tender years needs to be reviewed. 
P Studies should be initiated to determine the incidence of 
marriage breakdowns where custody and .maintenance of children 
are arranged extrajudicially and whether the practice conforms 
with the law. The practice of the lower courts also need to 
be studied. 
G-) The amounts of .monies paid for .maintenance ought not to be 
fixed statutorily but should be flexible and determinable within 
the circumstances of particular cases. 
H) There should be consistency in the law - regarding the 
definition of "Child" for purposes of custody and maintenance. 
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International legal standards and the laws of custody and Maintenance 
of Children in Kenya. 
The basic legislation pertaining to custody and maintenance of 
children in Kenya, the Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap. 144) was promul-
gated in the same year as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child.^ Principle 2 of the latter embodies the policy stipulated in 
Section 17 of the above Kenyan legislation by requiring states, when 
enacting laws for the purpose of affording children special protection and 
opportunities to develop physically, mentally and morally, to ensure that 
"the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration. 
Section 17 of the Kenya legislation, apart from making the 
interests of the child a factor of first and paramount consideration, also 
provides for the principle of equality of men and women in matters 
pertaining to rights and duties over children. This is in concert with 
2 
Article 16(l) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 as well 
as a provision in the more recent International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966.5 
4 
Various court pronouncements have also reiterated and endosed 
African, English. and Islamic customary practises which favour mothers, in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, with the custody of children 
of tender years. This too finds expression under Principle 6 of the U.N. 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child which decrees that"........ a child 
of tender years shall not,save in exceptional circumstances?be separated 
from his mother". 
1. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV) of 20th November, 1959. 
2. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 217 A(lll) of 10th December, 1948. 
3. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200A (xxi) of 16th December, 1966, 
Article 23 (4). 
4. See, for instance, in Taabu W/0 Kasungu v. Kalama, Misc. Civil 
Case No. 12 of 1977 (High Court) (Unreported). 
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THE LAW OP INHERITANCE AMD THE CHILD IN KENYA 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In every society the Law of inheritance enables man to live 
"the good life" as it is seen by that particular society. It endeavours, 
to see that the needs of the child as seen by that society are met. A 
society's perception of the good life changes as social organisation and 
values change. An illustration from the English Society whose legal 
thought is dominant in Kenya makes this point clear. In 19th Century 
England the laizzez-faire philosophy was accepted as the one that guaranteed 
everybody the opportunity of leading a 'good life' or a 'happy life', 
It was rooted in the view that all that man needed to live a good life 
was liberty to do what he chose. The government's sole duty was, that of 
.maintaining law and order. The law of inheritance gave effect to it. 
Any person who had property could will it to whoever he choose. He could 
disinherit such close relatives as a spouse, children, brothers and sisters 
and parents. Where he failed to make a will, the property devolved 
according to rules which assumed that he wanted the spouse and children if 
any to take irrespective of any needs of his other relatives. This idea 
of a good life is the one embodied in the Indian Succession Act, 1865 
which applies to Europeans and Parsees and to those other people to whom 
neither customary law nor Hindu law nor Islamic law applies. It is the 
curtailment of man's liberty by feudalism, the divine right of the Kings 
and that the brand;,of Chviftt|Anity then inforee that led man in England and 
Europe to clamour for that extreme form of liberty. When it was discovered 
in the 20th Century that the liberty caused injustices, the legislature 
and the courts started curtailing it to protect the economically weaker 
people 
The freedom of contract was qualified and new obligations 
imposed on industrialists and other people who injured or harmed others 
in exercise of their liberty in the area of inheritance the testator 
l.». Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, O.U.P., 1968, chapters 
2 and 3c The common Law, Public Policy And the Executive in (1956) 
Current Legal Problems, p.l 
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being denied in 1938, the liberty to disinherit his close relatives 
2* 
whom the legislature called dependent.. law had embodied the new view 
of good life. The law of Succession Act 1972, seeks to introduce to all 
Kenyans, the 1938 concept of liberty. Different concepts of a good 
life exist amongst Africans, Hindus and Moslems who have different laws 
of inheritance. In this paper, we show how the present Itow of inheritance 
of the Africans and the Europeans prevents the child from realising the 
good life as seen from the perspectives of the present laws own ideals 
and the new ideals which have not found expression in law. Time does not 
permit us to look at the position of the child -under both the Islamic 
law or Hindu law of inheritance. 
2. TE5 LAWS OF INHERITANCE IN FORCE TODAY 
Until the law of Succession Act3"*^ i g 7 2 COmes into operation 
the law of inheritance of the child will continue to vary with its 
: Sociological Community. The expression "Sociological Community" is used 
here because it is the Sociological test as opposed to an ethnic one 
which is used in determining who belongs to a particular community for 
4* the purposes of personal law. 
The four Kenya's Sociological Communities with different .marriage 
5* 
and inheritance laws which are equally protected by the supreme law , 
6* 
the Constitution , are Africans, Moslems, Hindus and Europeans. Their 
four systems of inheritance laws dealing with both the administration of 
2* See The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938. • 
3 . No. 14. It has been amended by the following Acts; Fo.,8 -
-of 1976, No.16 of 1977, No. 7 of 1975. 
It will come into operation on such date as the Minister .may 
by notice in the Gazette appoint. (.SI.). Even when it comes into 
operation, it will not necessarily apply to the whole country at once. 
See Sections 32 and 33. 
* 
4. See S.4 of Cap. 156, The Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and 
Succession Act, S. 66 (5) of the Kenya Constitution, Section 2 of Hindu 
Succession Act Cap. 158,S.2 of the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act Cap. 
157, S.2 of the African Christian Marriage and Divorce Act Cap. 151 
and S. 82 of the Kenya Constitution, Act No.5 of'1969. * 
5. S. 3 of the Constitution. * 
6. Section 66, 78, 82(4) (b). 
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estates and distribution are customary law, Islamic law, Hindu law and 
the Indian Succession Act, 1865, respectively. The extent to which 
English rules of inheritance will be applied as either the "Substance of 
the Common law", or as "the doctrines of equity" or as "statutes" which were 
7* 
in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, under the Judicature Act , 
1967, either to all the Communities or to the Europeans has not been 
determined by the courts. It is clear that some English inheritance rules 
apply to the Europeans under the Judicature Act where the Indian Succession 
Act is silent. The reception clause in Section 3(l) of the Judicature 
Act, 1967 which first appeared as article 11 of the 1897 order-in-Council, 
was intended to enable the colonists to live an English way of life in 
Kenya. 
Although th§ Constitution r©@p@etg and t?§ats as equal the way® 
of life reflected by the different laws of inheritance, the courts apply 
the law they think is better to the Africans at times. In the area of 
8* administration of estates, they have chosen not to apply customary law 
9* which the Magistrate's C-ourts Act 1967, requires to be applied and instead 
applied the English type of law which is contained in the Probate and 
Administration Act, 1881 of India which applies to the Hindus and some 
10* Moslems 
11* 
In Re Maangi , the court which did not refer to the Magistrate's 
Courts Act, 1967 and the relevant customary law, Kamba customary law, held 
that a provision that disapplied the Probate and Administration Act, 
1881 was discriminatory and consequently unconstitutional. The Superio-
rity of the 1881. Act was assumed. The court did not know that the 
relevant customary law serves non-material needs of the heirs which the 12* 13* 
Western Secular Society does not recognise today . In re Kibiego , 
the Nandi customary law which governs administration of estates 
was rejected because it was .medieval. To the court which did not 
7* . Ho. 16 of 1967, S.3 (l). 
8* Re Maangi (.1.968) E.A. 637 
Re Kibiego (1972) EA 179 
9* Act Ho. 17 of 1967, S.2 
10* Chadha v. Chadha (l96l) E.A. 637 
The Indian Succession Act 1863 which applies to Europeans contains 
rules governing both administration and distribution of estates. 
11* Supra. 
12* E. Contran's Restatement of African Law, Volume 2, Kenya, Law of 
Succession, Sweet & Maxwell, 1969, reveals the non-material needs in his 
statement of the law governing administration of estates under customary law. 
Also see John S. Mbiti, African Religious and Philosophy infra, Chapter 14. 
. Supra. 
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examine the rationale of the relevant rule amongst the Nandi, it discriminated 
against women who are not eligible for appointment as administratrixes. The 
desire of the Courts to reform customary law which they have viewed with a 
racial bias even after the "civilising mission" has come to an end politically, 
manifests itself in the treatment of rules of distribution too. In the matter 
of the Estate of Hopewell Gacharamu, deceased , the court which thought that 
the Kikuyu customary law rule which requires the estate of a polygamous man to 
be divided equally amongst his houses was good, modified it a little. Before 
the equal division takes place, a part of the estate not exceeding 50% of the 
estate must be kept aside for use by children irrespective of the house they 
come from. In another case the same court modified this rule differently. It 
held that the land left by a Kikuyu is to be divided equally amongst the sons 
15* irrespective of the houses and that the widows are to have life interests 
16* 
In Wanja Waichong'e v. Mwangi , the same court modified this further. 
It held that where the rule of equal division of the land amongst the houses has 
been applied, the childless widow gets absolute proprietorship in her share and 17* 
not to alife interest as is the case under customary law . Inadequacies have 
not been found in Hindu, European and Islamic rules of inheritance. 
3. THE GOOD LIFE AND THE TWO SYSTEMS OF INHERITANCE 
(i) Under the Indian Succession Act, 1865 
As it has been observed above, the Indian Succession Act, 1855, applied 
where it is believed that the individual will lead a happy or good life only, if 
he is given the maximum liberty to do what he chooses. The Government's role 
in such a social setting is merely to maintain law and order. At the level of 
the society, liberty is expected to provide the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number of the members of the society. The individual who is taken to be motivated 
entirely by material incentives is to be allowed to engage in any lawful economic 
opportunity, accumulate as much wealth as he is able and to use that wealth in 
any way he chooses 4 It is only this kind of situation that will ensure 
abundance for all and liberty. This view of liberty ignores the social 
structure of the society at the time it is accepted as the society's 
14*. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Miscellaneous Case No. 139 of 1974-. 
15*. The Daily Nation, September 21st 19 78 at p.4. 
16*. High Court of Kenya, Nairobi, Civil Appeal No.78 of 1976, unreported. 
17*. E. Contran, Restatement of African Law, Kenya, Volume 2, Law/Succes-
sion, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1969, p.12./of 
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guiding principle or it is to be deemed to have been accepted. At any 
time in society's stage of development there is a group which has been 
favoured by history. Such a group will be wielding political power and 
controlling the economic activities of that society. The liberty ideal 
accepted is a sanction of the status quo and therefore condemns some to 
perpetual .misfortune and guarantees continued priviledge to the advantaged. 
If this concept of liberty were to apply to a society where the material and 
social conditions were equal to all, for instance at the time the society 
is founded or after equalisation of fortunes by a state, it would en&bie 
.man to live a really good life. 
Again as it was observed above, where the good life is seen 
in the preceding paragraph, the individual has the liberty to will his 
18* property as he chooses . Where he dies intestate his property is 
19* 
distributed to his relatives where they exist according to his presumed 
20* 
intentions „ The law of inheritance assumes that .man in such a society 
has property which can be disposed of. looked at from a historical 
perspective, the ideal creates a situation where .many people will not have 
any property to dispose of. The supply and demand rules of the economy 
that go with this ideal expect that situation to occur as a part of the 
way of providing .man with the incentive to work. A tension is created at 
a theoretical level between the need to .maintain the life which the value 
of liberty presupposes and the need to give man .maximum liberty by keeping 
the government intervention to a minimum. This ideal which applies to 
those governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1865, takes out of the law 
of inheritance those who do not own property. Their children too are 
taken out of the law of inheritance by the same condition of the poverty 
of the parents. Where a person owns property the Indian Succession Act, 1865, 
21* which is a codification of English law of inheritance as it was in 1860s , 
22* will perpetuate the fortune and life style of the family. 
This is the position under the Indian Succession Act, 1865 
19*. Sections 20 - 25. 
20*. Sections 25 -42. 
21*. Manteakis y. Manteakis (l_954) 27 K.L.R. 32. I t h e matter 
of the Will of Edward Watts (1955) "28° K.L.-R. 236 . 
22* James M. Morton, The Theory of Inheritance (1894-95)8 
Harvard Law Review, 161,pp.164 & 167. 
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The property left will often help the heirs to maintain a 
life-style identical to that of the deceased or close to it. Where 
such a person acts capriciously - and this will be rarely considering the 
ties that develop in a family - the close relatives will be denied the 
life-style they expect if he wills the property to strangers to the 
family. Children whose lnherit*nc«c law is Indian Succession Act, 1865, 
are exposed to this danger too. Where no will is .made, the law assumes 
that he would have liked his relatives to inherit and it arranges the 
23* heirs in a number of categories . Pirst it assumes that infact and 
according to the ideal the family is made up of the other spouse and their 
24* 
children . The heirs of such a .man are the widow who gets a third of 
the estate and the lineal descendant i.e. his children, grand-children 
and great grand-children who take the remaining two thirds. The ideal 
therefore goes with the western nuclear family. The deceased's brothers 
and sisters and parents to say nothing of other relatives are considered 
to be too distant to be .made objects of his bounty. Secondly it assumes 
that the individual has been so liberated from the society that he does 
not recognise the duty to raise a family which duty Africans consider to 2 5* 
be both religious and ontological. Consequently the children of the 
deceased get equal shares of the estate irrespective of the sex. Under 
customary law, women get a floating life interest from the father as 
they are expected to get another life interest when they marry. It is 
suspended by the marriage and revive when they come back to the family. 
Where the deceased is survived by a widow and no lineal descendants, the 
former takes a half of the estates and the other half goes to the other 
26* relatives. . Where he is survived by the widow, the father, .mother 
27* 
and brothers and sisters, the father takes the half alone. The Act 
recognises man as the head of the family. It assumes that the father can 
be counted to act fairly amongst his relatives in connection with the 
inheritance. Where the father does not survive the deceased, the .mother, 28* brothers and sisters share the estate equally. Where some brothers 
23*.,. SS. 26 - 42 
24*. S. 27 
25*. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Heinemann, 
1969,p.133. 
26*.. - S. "7 
27*. .S .35 
28*. S.36 
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and sisters have died but have been survived by children, these will 
29* 
take their parents' shares. Where the deceased is surviTed by the 
widow and the mother of the deceased, each of these takes a half of the 
estate. Other relatives of the deceased take if those mentioned above 
do not survive him. 
The Act further assumes that the people It applies to have 
a very secular way of life. It states rules governing the administration 
of estates and distribution. It has no rules indicating how the death 
is faced by the bereaved. It concerns itself with primarily material 
needs of the people. The writer take the view that man has material and 
non-material needs that call for satisfaction, The "good life" that goes 
with the Indian Succession Act, 1865 today raises the following questions 
in Kenya:-
(i) Should the siti ition be allowed to continue where some 
people including children should be kept out of the law 
of inheritance? 
(ii) ' If the answer is in the affirmative, shouldn't the 
state provide for those kept out of support that will 
enable them to live in dignity if not the way that 
those within the purview of the law of inheritance do? 
(iii) Should the law of inheritance" continue" to pay little 
attention to the non-material needs of the individual? 
(iv) Should the family structure envisaged by the Act be 
enlarged and if so, to what extent? 
(v) What kind of freedom of testation is required today? 
(vi) Should the Act continue to be sex-blind? 
Some possible answers to questions (iv), (v) and (vi) are to be 
found in Sections 26, 5, 29 and 35 - 42 of the law of Succession Act, 1972. 
We do not think that satisfactory answers have been found. There is a need 
for legislation that protects the child who cannot lead a normal life 
because the parents do not leave any property that could permit a life 
style that enables it to live a good life. The welfare state which has 
rejected the 19th Century liberty has in principle accepted a broader 
function of the state. The- question is whether or not it will come to the 
protection of the child now. 
29* S .37 and 38 
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(ii) Under Customary Law 
Customary law of inheritance embodies a view of good life 
which is different from the one embodied by the Indian Succession Act, 
1865. Pirst the Africans believe that human equality and dignity cannot 
be realised by everybody unless the material equality of some kind is 
30* 
maintained. Crucial resources like land were communally owned and 
therefore were taken from the entire realm of inheritance. One's member-
ship to a tribe, a clan or family was all that was needed to give one 
access to land. It is worthy of note that in socialist countries, the 
same belief is given effect by the policy which either prevents certain 
resources from being owned by individuals or restricts, as in Yugoslavia, 
agricultural land and Societ Union, the dwelling houses, that the 
individual can own. Second they believed that it is the family that helps 31* man to discover his own identity. Life centred around the endeavour 
32* 
to maintain personal immortality . It is only through marrying and 
having children that one can maintain this personal immottality?^* 
Thirdly they believed that it was only through the institution of extended 
family that the individual could realise the good life. When he died 
the family mourned his or her death and chose the administrator or 34* 
confirmed one at a family gathering . The heirs were members of the 
3 5* 
family . The privately owned property could be disposed of by means 
of an oral will but in most of the Kenyan communities, the testator did 
not have power to give property to those who did not belong to the family 
He could not disinherit the children and other relatives the way a 
testator can under the Indian Succession Act, 1865. Where he died intestate 37 
the members of the family inherited . Death and infertility at times 
drastically reduced the chances of one maintaining personal immortality 
through procreation. This threat together with need to satisfy other » 
human needs led the Africans to have the 1evirate ..union, thjs Sororate 
Union, Widow inheritance, and woman to woman marriages as supplement to" 
,36* 
30* Jffluluwa Gwanombi v. A Alidina Visram. (1913-1914) 5 K.L.R. 145, 
(1915-1916) 6 K.L.R. 31. J.K. Nyerere, National Property and Ujamaa. The 
Basis of African Socialism in Preedom and Unity, O.U.P. 1967,pp.53-58, 
pp.162-171. 
31*. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, chapter 10. 
32*. Chapter 3. 
33*. Chapter 3 and 13. 
34* See generally E. Cotran, Restatement of African Law, Supra. 
35*. N.A. Ollenu, The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana in (l97l) 
Journal of African law 132 at p. 150. E. Contran, Restatement of African 
Law, Supra. 
36*. Supra. 
37". Supra. 
- 42 - IDS/OP 35 
38* the .marriage which was either polygamous or potentially polygamous 
Their understanding of human nature led them to reject .monogamy which 
is based on the existence of perfect .men and women. The ideal life 
customary law embodies ensures (i) that the social arrangements do not keep 
out any class of people out of the law of inheritance: Certain forms of 
property belong to all, the dead, the living and those to come; (ii) that 
the individual is not given power to weaken the family through disinheri-
ting relatives: (iii) that .man's non-material needs are met by the 
family structure and the way the estate is administered. Man is insured 
39* against .material and emotional deprivation. 
This view of life has come under pressure from the free enter-
prise economy, its value system and the institutions which were introduced 
during the colonial rule and retained after independence. 
The child and the adult are protected in all respects by this 
ideal which is now under pressures. The following two questions arise 
today:-
(i) to what extent are some of the principles of this ideal 
reflected by the customary law inforce today? 
(ii) to what extent, if at all, can today's Kenya benefit from 
the pre-colonial ideal? 
The conflict between customary law governing administration of estates and 
the English type of law contained in the Probate and Administration Act 
and the different court attitudes towards, the customary law rule that 
requires the estate of a polygamous .man to be divided equally amongst the 
houses reflect the conflict between the two ideals discussed here and the 
respective institutions that go with them. 
38* John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Supra. 
Chapter 13 and E. Cotran, Restatement of African Law, Kenya, Volume 1, 
Marriage and Divorce. Sweet & Maxwell, 1968. 
39*. N. Songuemas, Social Security Among Traditional Societies 
in Africa in East Africa Journal, .May 19.68, pp.13. - 18. J.K. Nyerere, 
Ujamaa. The Basis / African Socialism in / of Freedom and Unity, 
O.U.P. 19,67 pp. 162 - 171. 
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4. TEE LAW OF INHERITANCE AND THE CHILD IN KENYA 
(i) Under the Indian Succession Act, 1865 
Our discussion of the good life that goes with this system of 
inheritance, reveals two problems that the state ought to solve. The 
first one is that of keeping some adults and their children out of the 
law of inheritance through not giving them an opportunity to own-
property. Such people are discriminated against within the .meaning of 
Section 82 of the country's constitution. If it is conceded as we 
believe all will concede that everyone has a right to life and .means to 
support it, two options exist. The first one is ordering the society in 
a way that ensures that one can own some property. The second one is to 
enact welfare legislation that enables those who do not inherit to get 
assistance from the state that enables them to .maintain a decent standard 
of living. Either of them will protect both the child born out of 
.marriage and the one born within marriage. -The second problem stems from 
the inadequacy of the Act in two respects; firstly by giving the property 
owner the "liberty" to disinherit the child and other close relatives 
through a will and secondly by adopting a narrow concept of the family. 
The second problem ha& been solved by the law of Succession Act, 1972, to 
a large extent. Every testator .must make a provision for his dependants 
who include children and where he fails to do so, the Court will make it 
40* if the dependant applies to the Court. The class of dependants include 
41* .members of the extended family. The Act still gives the nuclear family 
42* greater protection than it deserves. Relatives of the deceased other 
than the spouse and child are dependants only if they were being maintained 
43* 
by him at the time of death. Flexibility should be introduced to cover 
those who become dependant after the death of the property owner. The 
draftsman forgot that it is naturally to these relatives that the nuclear 
family turns to in the event of dependency after death of the property 
owner. 
(ii) Under Customary Law 
Today, the child whose law of inheritance is customary law .may 
face problems at four levels. A fifth level will be added to these if 
proposed changes in law governing inheritance and marriage come to fruition. 
v 40*. S. 26 
41*. S. 29 
42*. Supra 
43*. 29 (b) 
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First,.many children have parents who do not own property which 
they can inherit 'under customary law because the free enterprise economy 
has affected their families adversely. The co.mmunual holding of land in 
precolonial Kenya has been replaced by family and individual holding of 
44* 
land in Kenya. The general weakening of the pre-colonial ideal has 
created a situation where some people do not have a stake in the economy 
at all. Where family or clan land has been registered under the Registered 
Land Act in the name of one person following the family understanding, 
heirs have been disinherited by an interpretation of the Act that ignores 45* the habits of thought that existed at the time of registration. 
It has been erroneously held that the land belongs to only those whose 
46* names appear in the land register. Two studies show clearly that the 
correct position is that the proprietor is a trustee who holds the family 
47 land upon trust for himself and other .members sometimes. There are now 
48* 
.more decisions that support this view than support the erroneous view. 
Where a child belongs to a family whose name does not appear in a register, 
the danger exists that it will be disinherited if the wrong interpretation 
of the Registered Land Act is adopted. Such a child will be in the same 
position as the one whose parents.'4© not own property. It is this class 
of people to be found also in ideal of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, 
44*. See Generally, Gibson Kamau Kuria, The Role of Customary Land 
Tenure in Rural Development in Kenya, a paper presented at the Seminar on 
Law and Rural Development, July 18-22, 1977 at Kisumu. 
45*. Obiero V. Opiyo (1972) E.A 227 
46*. .Supra, Mary Wanjiku V. Nganga, s/o Mary Wanjiku, High Court 
of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 2497 of 1977 (unreported). 
47*. Gibson Kamau Kuria, The Role of Customary Land Tenure in Rural 
Development/Kenya unpublished paper presented at the / in Seminar on 
Law and Rural Development held at Kisumu, July 18-22 .1977, Mathew Muli, 
Problematic Aspects of Land Law, a paper presented at the Law Society 
Conference, April. 1978. 
48*. Mung'ora Wamathai V. Muroti Mugweru, High Court of Kenya at 
Nyeri, Civil Case Ho. 56 of 1972, Muguthu V. Muguthu (l97l) K.H.D. 16 
The Standard, January 3, 1979 p.7 
Samuel Thata Miskek v. Pri&cilla Wambui, High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 1400 of 1973, Mani v. Mani, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 34 of 1977. A few .more are referred 
to by Justice Muli in his paper. 
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which requires financial assistance from the state. Localisation of the 
judiciary and industry on the part of the Bar can also help in getting 
the correct position understood. 
The second level is the determination of who is a child for 
the purposes of the law of inheritance. At this level, there is property 
to be inherited. Generally speaking, the child in law of inheritance is 
the legitimate child. Under customary law there are three classes of 
ligitimate children for the purposes of the law of inheritance. The 
first class is that of the many children who are born in wedlock. The 
second class is that of the children born outside wedlock by unmarried 
mothers but are recognised as the children of deceased. This is the case 
49* under the Luhya and Kisii customary laws. Under some customary laws 
like Kikuyu customary law, children born out of wedlock belong to the 
50* 
woman's family and that is where they can inherit property. The third 
class is that of the children born within marriage but fathered by a man 
other than their mother's husband. Except where rules of natural justice 
demand that they stay with their biological father, they are recognised 51* 
under customary law as the children of the regular union. The 
children who have faced the problem of recognition belong to the first 
class where their parents either have married under customary law after 
the father has married another woman under either the African Christian 52 a* Marriage and Divorce Act or The Marriage Act or have married through 
49* E. Contran, Restatement of African Law, Kenya, Volume 1, Marriage 
and Divorce, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968 pp. 55, 68. 
50* E.Contran, Restatement African Law, Volume 1 Supra, See for 
instance pp.18, 30, 42, 55. 
51* Momanyi Nyamberi v. Onwonga Nyaboga (1953) 1 Court of Review 
Reports p.5. 
Ngoko Nyandiko v. Kembo D/O Motanya (1953) 3 Court of Review 
Reports p.2. 
Moraa d/o Obare v. Maina Nyakong'o (1953) 3 Court of Review 
Reports, p.10. 
Maurono Onchoke v. Kerebe d/o Ondieki (1958) 6 Court of Review 
Report,p.2 
i 
Tamina Oienja v. Elam Keya (1962^ 10 Court-of Review Reports, p.8 
Although these cases dealt with custody, it is submitted that 
the results would have been the same if the inheritance issues arose. 
52a* In the Matter of The Estate of Ruenji, deceased, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Miscellaneous Case No. 136 of 1975 (unreported) and 
In the Matter of the Estate of B.H. Ogola, deceased? High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi, Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 19 of 1976. 
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52 b* 
elopement under customary law. They start cohabiting and then 
undertake to fill customary requirements later. The Courts have held 
that these .marriages are void and consequently that the children are 52 •* not children for the purposes of the law of inheritance, As the 
53* 
writer has argued elsewhere, the Kenya constitution and the common law 
enalogy of domicile permits the conversation of a .marriage from one 
character to another in Kenya and many people who .marry under either of 
the above mentioned Acts subsequently convert these marriages by the 
operation of law into customary ones and later .marry other wives under 
customary law which allows polygamy. There is one decision which supports 
54* 
this view. If the Courts recognise conversion of a .marriage by 
operation of the law .many children will be protected, legislation today 
permits conversion of a customary .marriage through a ceremony into a 55* western type of monogamous .marriage. It also permits the conversion 56* of a customary .marriage into a Moslem .marriage» 
The third level is where the estate of a deceased who had two 
or .more wives is to be divided amongst the .members of his houses. The 
Africans take the view that polygamy supports human nature better than 
monogamy. Although .most of the customary .marriages are .monogamous in fact, 
customary law has not endeavoured to discourage it the way the commission 
57* on the law of Marriage and Divorce chose to do. The Africans take the 
52b* Tawe v. Public Trustee, Court of Appeal for East Africa, Civil 
Case No. 19 of 1976. 
52 c* Yawe v. Public Trustee, Court of Appeal for East Africa, Civil 
Appeal No. 13 of 1976. 
53*. Gibson Kamau Kuria, The law of Succession in Kenya,a paper 
presented at the Kenya law Society Conference, April 1978 pp.31 - 35. 
54^ Qmwoya Mairura v. Bos ire Angida (1958) 6 Court of Review 
Reports at p.4„ 
55*. Cap, 151, S0 9 and possibly ss. 11 and 35 of the Marriage Act, 
Cap. 150. There is no express reference to conversion in The Marriage 
Act. 
56* Cap. 156, S06o 
57*. Report of the Commission On the Law of Marriage and Divorce, 
Government Printer, Nairobi, 1968, Paragraphs 73-81. 
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view that like the monogamous .marriage, the leviratic union, widow 
inheritance, the sororate union and woman to woman .marriages, polygamy 
58* 
enabled them to lead the good life as they saw it. The customary 
law of inheritance gives effect to the principle of equality of spouses. 
In .most of the Kenyan Communities, livestock that comes to the household 59* apart, the property is divided equally amongst the houses. The 
livestock that comes to a house as dowry belongs to that house. Amongst 
60* the luhya and Teso, the size of a house's share varies with the number 
61* 
of sons in each house. Amongst the Kisii, the Elgeyo, Marakwet and 
62* 
Tugen, the size of the house's share varies with the seniority of the 
widow. The seniority is established by the time the .marriage takes place. 
The court decisions there are indicate how the rule of equal division has 
been applied amongst the Kikuyus. In the Matter of the Estate of Gacharanu 
63* 
deceased, as seen above the Court which considered this rule to be good 
.modified it with a view to protecting children. It held that before 
equal division took place, a part of the estate, in that case 40$ ought 
to be set aside for the use by children alone. As only one house of the 
two which had children, one house got 30$ of the estate whilst the other 
got 70$. The Court did not appear to realise that this decision departed 
from the principle of equality of spouses. It also appears to have forgotten 
that the childless widow .might be "inherited" by a brother of the deceased 
and have as .many children, i f not. nore than i the one who had children. The 
children born after the deceased dies will not be protected by this decision. 
The other two decisions that have applied this rule are based on the 
ignorance of the rule that says that women who are expected to .marry have 
a life interest in'property of a deceased either in the family they are 
58*. John S. M'biti, African Religions and Philosophy, Chapters 
3 & 13. 
59*. E. Cotran, Restatement cf African Law, 2, Kenya, The Law of 
Succession, Supra,. Kikuyu, p.13, Kamba,p.23, Meru, p. 35, Kuria,p.68, 
Gdriamp.,p.78. Taita,p.l03, Taveta,p.lll, Nandi & Kipsigis,p.l20, 
Pokot,p.l37, Luo p.162. 
60* pp. 46 and 145. 
61* p. 56. 
62*. p. 128 
63* Supra 
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born in or in the family they join after marriage. ' As seen above, 
in one case, the court has held that land is to be divided equally 
amongst the sons of the deceased., The report available is silent 
about the position of life interests of the daughters of the deceased,, 
The widows it indicated retain the life interests. In Wanja ffaichonge 
7, Mwangi laichonge, Supra, it was held that where the deceased 
divides during his time-following 'Kikuyu Customary Law - his land 
amongst his wives, the widow with no child gets an absolute title as 
opposed to a life interest. The effect of this decision was to reduce 
the shares of the other sons of the deceased who are entitled to equal 
shares if the widow dies childless. These are the children who are 
entitled to inherit land after the life interest of the widow 
determines. The Court did not address its mind to the possibility 
of the widow having children 'belonging to the deceased's family. 
These three decisions reflect a reforming zeal which, is not informed 
'by the view of life held by the co.mm.uniti.es concerned. The place of 
polygamy and the various forms that the marriage takes after the death of 
the deceased have been ignored. 
The fetirfch 'level is the administration of estates. The way 
that the estate is administered 'under customary law is tied up 
66* 
with the way the bereaved family faces death. The children 
participate in the funeral rites. The family elders who help them in 
life either confirm or appoint an administrator, Besides it is only 
the family elders who best 'understand the family situation, the wishes 
of the deceased and the peculiar needs of the .members of the family. 
The family solidarity cements the family unit and contributes to the 
emotional development of the child. Whereas in Re Maangi, Supra, and 
Re Kibiego, Supra, customary law is replaced by Probate and Admini-
stration Act, the child is forced to live its life in an emotionally 
deprived nuclear family 'backgroundo It is the materialism and racism 
of the Court among other factors that explain this trend. 
The fourth level will exist when the proposed changes come 
to fruition as noted above. The definition of a child in the Law of 
Succession Act, 1972 does not tie a child to the union of its mother 
64*o pp. 12 - 15. 
65*. See generally, Restatement of African Law Kenya,Volume 2, 
Law of Succession, Supra. 
66*. John S, Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Chapter 14. 
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and father which, union .-may be a .marriage or mere cohabitation. On 
the face of it this is a good .move. A child under it includes a 
"child whether born or not as long as the latter is born alive, 
any child recognised or in fact accepted by the father as child of 
his own, and any child for whom the father has in his lifetime 
67* 
voluntarily assumed responsibility." Children born both within 
and without marriage are therefore protected. One hopes that the 
word "recognised" refers to those children recognised as children 
of the deceased by customary law. If this is done, even the 
children of the leviratic unions, that come into existence after 
the .man dies will be covered. The danger however exists that the 
marriage institution will be used as a yardstick to determine the 
children the deceased "recognised or accepted in fact as his own". 
If this is done, many children will be disinherited when the Act 
comes into operation. 
If it becomes law the Marriage Bill 1979 also will create 
problems for the children if the marriage is used to determine the 
children that belong to the deceased. These will come from 
provisions that will govern conversion of .marriages from potentially 
polygamous to .monogamy and the vice versa and some of those 
68* 
which will seek to discourage polygamy. A» seen above 
children have faced problems where their father has converted his 
first .monogamous .marriage into a customary one and subsequently 
.married their .mother under customary law. This conversion by 
the operation of law has not been recognised by the Courts. 
Consequently the children are considered to be illegitimate for 69* 
the purposes of the law of inheritance. Section 19 of the 
Bill which will allow .monogamous .marriages to be converted into 
potentially polygamous marriages makes it clear that the conversion 
will be effected only by a joint declaration that they agree to 
70* change. Since those wishing to convert often contract . .marriages 
67*. Act No. 14 of 1972, S. 3. 
68*. Sections 19 and 23. 
69*. In the Matter of The Estate of Ruenji, Deceased, Supra and 
In The Matter of the Estate of B.H. Ogola, deceased, Supra, 
70*. 19 (3). 
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7'1* 
*through elopement'" this provision will be ignored and the children 
will not be considered to be legitimate for the purposes of inheritance. 
Section 23 of the Bill which reads as follows make this clear:-
23 (l) No husband While married by a .monogamous marriage 
shall contract another .marriage. 
5 o CONCLUSIONS 
Our discussion which assumes that our society today believes 
that every child in Kenya ought to be enabled to live in human dignity 
and human equality shows that the ideas of good life reflected by the 
Indian Succcession Act, 1865 and the customary law of inheritance keep 
out of the law of inheritance those children whose parents are so disad-
vantaged that they leave no property on death.. Without material provision 
made either by their late parents or the state the lives or lives with 
dignity of the children of the ^tsadyantaged are threatened. There is a 
need for the state (i) to review the vision of the good, life as seen 'by 
everyone, adult or child today and (ii.) to pass legislation that provides 
financial assistance to the children of the disadvantaged so that they too 
have as good an opportunity to enjoy life as the other children. The 
discussion also shows that the courts' application of the customary law 
of inheritance is causing great problems. 'They have interpreted the 
Registered Land Act in a way that takes away children's inherited land 
rights. T^ey have failed to 'understand the way in which monogamous 
marriages are converted into customary ones which, permit polygamy. They 
do not understand the 'basis of the rule that requires that the property of 
This customary .mode of bringing a customary marriage into existence 
has been referred to expressly Omondi v. Nyafula (1.972) K.H.D. 91. "For 
its discussion see Gordon Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Marriage Laws, 
Government Printer, 1968 p.122, Stanley Kiama Gathigira, Miik.ari.ne ya 
Agikuyu C.M.S. Bookshop, 1942, Nairobi, p.'1.7. It has been applied in the 
following Tanzania decisionss-
(i) Bernard Bayikafundi v. Tamayali (1970) H.C.D. 11, 
(ii) Nyakanga v. Mehego (1971 ) H.C'.D.- 2.70. 
(iii) Adam Kharid v. Arnina Rajabu (1968) H.C.D. 405. It 
explains well the results in Zipporah Wairimu v. Paul. 
Muehe.mi, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil. Case 
No, 1280 of 1970, Peter Hinga v. Mary Wanjiku, High Court 
of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Appeal No, 94 of 1977, Xawe v. 
Publ1c Trustee, Court of Appeal for East Africa, Civil 
Appeal No. 1.3 of 1976. 
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polygamously .married .man be divided equally amongst his houses 
irrespective of the number of the children in each and of sex. They 
do not know that emotional deprivation occurs when the administration 
of the estate takes place outside the African family. Their ignorance of 
vital customs like elopement creates a situation where law is rendered 
uncertain and some children are denied their rights because the courts 
do not understand that they are children in law. It is clear from the 
way the courts have approached inheritance disputes discussed above that 
they are both socially and psychologically insulated from the African 
resJLlty, localisation of the courts appears to the writer to be the only 
true solution to these problems. 
Whenever it comes into operation, the law of Succession Act, 
1972 will not solve the problems faced by those governed by customary law 
of inheritance discussed above because the legislature did not address its 
.mind to these problems at the time it enacted it. 
- 52. - IDS/OP 35 
SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS ON THE LAWS OP INHERITANCE AND THE CHILD IN KENYA 
Rapporteur: A.H. KHAMATI 
Many comments and queries were raised on Mr. Kuria's paper. 
Seminar participants expressed concern that where a person dies intestate 
the Public Trustee's Department holds the estate of the deceased for far 
too long with the result that many children have lost an opportunity to 
education because they have no funds to pay school fees. It was observed 
that the delays are typical of the general administrative and judicial 
process in the Attorney General's Office and in the Judiciary and for 
the latter it is hoped that the Law Society Committee that is supposedly 
examining the .matter will come out with helpful recommendations, As for 
the former it was suggested that the Attorney General be requested to 
consider the expansion of the office of the Public Trustee and increase 
its personnel throughout the country in order to .make information .more 
readily available so that funds in the Public Trustees custody are not 
held too long. 
There was some differences of opinion on Mr Kuria's criticism 
of the .Gaw of Succession Act, 1972 of Kenya which introduced the individual 
liberty concept. Mr, Kuria was of the opinion that this causes injustices 
as it does not protect those protected by our customary law of inheritance.-
One seminar participant expressed the view that the Registered Land Act 
has not introduced new rights to land proprietors as registration under 
this Act is preceded by an adjudication process in accordance with 
customary law. This view was rejected by another seminar participant 
who observed that the concept of indefeasibility of title was introduced 
by the Act in favour of the registered individual proprietor and this is 
foreign to the customary law. The Act has introduced individual aspects 
to override the customary law communal aspects so that individuals are 
able to dispose of the lands liberally and mortagage them as they wish.. It 
is for this reason that the new Marriage Bill is introducing the concept 
of Matrimonial Property although in a limited form which is akin to the 
customary law ownership system barring an individual member of a family 
from disposing of family property in disregard .,: of the welfare interests of 
the other family .members. Another Seminar participant wanted to know how 
liabilities of a deceased person devolve as Mr, Kuria's paper dealt only 
with the assets. 

! 
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THE LAW OP ADOPTION IN KENYA 
By 
Sir. Humphrey S'lade, 
Former Speaker, 
National Assembly of Kenya. 
THE LAW OF ADOPTION IN KENYA 
1. Meaning Of "Adoption" 
1.1. In legal parlance, "Adoption", with reference to children, 
means a process whereby children are separated finally and completely 
from their natural parents (if any ) and other relatives, and become the 
children of adopting parents for all legal purposes, including inheritance. 
1.2. Legal Adoption is not to be confused with "Fostering"; 
which means the temporary care of a child, over a period of any length of 
time, without any change of its legal status, any permanent separation 
from its natural relatives, or any right of inheritance from the foster 
parents. 
1.3. Traditional forms of adoption are recognised by the 
customary law of some African tribes, though fostering by relatives is 
a more common custom; and it is thought that such customary adoptions still 
have legal effect whether or not the tribe concerned is expressly exempted 
from the general law (see paragraph 17 below). 
1.4. De facto "adoptions", not sanctioned either by Court Order 
or by customary law, though sometimes taking place, have no legal effect 
whatsoever on the status of the parties concerned, beyond responsibility 
of the "adopters" for the welfare of the child while in their care. 
2. Importance Of Adoption. 
2.1. Though there has been a Law of Adoption in Kenya since 
1933, it is only in recent years that it has been required for African children 
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on any scale. That is because in the past all homeless African children 
were cared for by customary fostering or occasional customary adoption, 
and there was neither need or place for legal Adoption Orders so far as 
they were concerned. 
2.2. However, changing social conditions, and particularly the 
much greater cost of providing for children (including their education), 
urbanization, increasing detribalization, and a regrettable increase in 
the number of children born out of wedlock, have now produced hundreds of 
unwanted children for whom traditional .methods of fostering or adoption 
no longer provide. 
2.3. Adoption is a factor of vital importance in our efforts 
to find homes for these homeless children. 
2.4. Though we have many institutional homes for such children, 
which do all that they possibly can for them, those homes cannot house 
.more than a very small percentage of all who are in need. In any case, 
a true home with adopting or fostering parents, which can give to the 
child a real sense of belonging to identifiable people, is obviously 
preferable to the comparatively impersonal institutional home, however 
beautifully built and .managed. Also it costs .much less. 
2.5. It is difficult, however, to find .many people, other than 
relatives, who are willing to act as foster-parents, because they do not 
like the idea of being given merely temporary care of the children concerned. 
Having once looked after them, they cannot bear to part with them. 
Moreover, foster-parents usuall-- have to be paid for .maintenance of the 
child, and resources for that purpose are limited. 
2.6. Therefore legal adoption, involving permanent attachment 
to adopting parents who will treat the adopted child in every way as their 
own child, is the only way of providing for the majority of these children 
who have no other homes. 
3. The Present Law 
3.1. The Adoption Act 1933 was .modelled very closely on the 
English Adoption of Children Act 1927, being designed and then needed .mainly 
for adoption of non-African children (see paragraph 2.1. above). 
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3.2. It was replaced by the present Adoption Act (Cap.143) 
in 1959, but without much substantive change, 
3.3. In 1973 the President appointed a Commission to review 
the existing law and practice in relation to adoption of children, 
with regard in particular to traditional customs and current public 
opinions, and to possible simplification and reduction of the cost of 
adoption proceedings. That Commission reported in 1974, its recommendations 
were accepted by the Government, and the existing Adoption Act was amended 
accordingly in 1978. 
3.4. The Act, as so amended, is described by the following 
paragraphs. 
4. Who May Be Adopted? 
4.1 The Act allows, subject to its provisions, adoption of 
any unmarried person under the age of eighteen years who is resident in 
Kenya (see section 3(l), definition of "infant" in section 2(l), and 
section (4) ( 4 ) . 
4.2. There is no provision for legal adoption of adults or 
married persons. 
5. Who May Adopt ? 
5.1 An application for an Adoption Order can, subject as stated 
below, be made by any man or woman or married couple resident in Kenya 
(see section 3 (2) and ( 3 ) , and 4 (4). 
5.2 This is conditional on:-
(a) the applicant, or one of married applicants, being:-
(i) at least twenty-five years old, and twenty-one 
years older than the child concerned; or 
(ii) at least twenty-one years old and a relative 
of the child (as defined by section 2(l); or 
(iii) the mother or father of the child (see section 
4 (l)); and 
(b) the child having been continously in the care and 
possession of the applicant for at least three months 
preceding the application (see section 4 (5)). 
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5«3. However, an Adoption Order is not to be made in favour 
of:- (a) a sole applicant who is a male; or 
(b) a spouse or spouses of a polygamous marriage; or 
(c) an applicant who is of difference race from the child; 
unless the Court is satisfied that there are special circumstances which 
justify it (see section 4 ( 3 ) ) . 
6. Consents Required 
6.1. An Adoption Order cannot be .made without the consent 
of:- (a) the parents or guardians of the child, or 
or other persons liable to contribute towards its 
maintenance; 
(b) the father of an illegitimate child, if he acknowledged 
paternity and is contributing towards its maintenance; 
(c) the parents of the mother of an illegitimate child, if 
she is under eighteen years of age; or 
(d) the wife or husband (if any) of the applicant; 
unless the Court dispenses with such consent (see section 
4 (6)). 
6.2 The Court it empowered to dispense with consent:-
(a) in the case of a parent or guardian who has abandoned, 
neglected or persistently failed to maintain or persistently 
ill treated the child, or failed to exercise the normal duty 
and care of parenthood; 
(b) in the case of a person liable to contribute towards the 
.maintenance of the child who has persistently failed to do so; 
(c) in the case of any person who cannot be found or is incapable 
of giving consent ( and still incapable at the time of 
.making an Adoption Order); 
(d) in the case of any person, other than the wife or husband of 
the applicant, if satisfied that consent is unreasonably 
withheld; 
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(e) in the case of a wife or husband of an applicant where 
they are living apart and their separation is likely to 
be permanent (see sections 5(l) and (2), and 8(d)). 
6.3. There are presumptions of 
(a) abandonment, if the child appears to have been 
abandoned at birth, or the person having care and 
possession of the child has not heard fare®,. Ufcffi pasfttttt 
or guardian for at least six months; and 
(b) persistent failure to .maintain, where no parent or 
guardian has contributed to the .maintenance of the 
child for at least six months, and such failure -is 
not due to poverty (see provisoes to section 5(l) (a)). 
6.4. Consent may be given, either unconditionally or subject to 
conditions concerning religious up-bringing, without knowing the identity 
of the applicant (and usually is so given); and subsequently withdrawal of 
consent so given on the ground that the identity of the applicant is 
• unknown is deemed to be unreasonable withholding of consent (see section £( 
6.5. Where a child is in the care and possession of an adoption 
society, there can be valid consent to its future adoption by anyone 
approved by that society, provided that an adopter is found by the society 
within the next twelve .months, (see section 7B)° 
6.6. In the absence of any person whose consent is required, 
such consent .may be proved by a document signed by that person in the 
prescribed form, and attested by someone of a prescribed class; except in 
the case of consent by the .mother before the child is six weeks old (see 
section 6). 
6.7. In considering whether or not to dispense with the consent 
of any person, the Court .must regard the interests of the child as 
paramount; and, subject thereto, the interests of its parents and relatives 
in preference to those of the applicant (see section 5(6)). 
6.8. With regard to all consents, the Court .must be satisfied 
that the consenting party fully understands the nature and effect of an 
Adoption Order (see section 7 (l) (a))o 
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6.9 Consent may be withdrawn, without leave of the Court, at 
any time before an Adoption Order is made (see section 5(7)). 
'7'. 'Custedy Pending Application 
7.1. Where consent has been given by a parent or guardian, 
he may not, without leave of the Court, remove the child from the care 
and possession of the applicant (see section 5(4)). 
7.2. The applicant may in any case, at any time while his 
application is pending, apply for custody of the child until decision 
thereon (see section 5(5)). 
8. Matters To Be Considered By The Court 
8.1. Before .making an Adoption Order, the Court .must be 
satisfied, not only in accordance with the requirements stated by paragraphs 
4,5, and 6 above, but also that:-
(a) the Order is in the best interests of the child, with due 
regard to both its wishes (according to age and understanding) 
and the applicant's ability to .maintain and educate it; 
(b) the applicant is not receiving any -payment or other reward 
for the adoption; and 
(c) where the applicant is not a relative of the child, reasonable 
steps have been taken to inform its relatives (as defined 
by section 2(l)) of the proposed adoption, and-no relative 
able to accept its care has expressed willingness to do so 
(see section 7 (l))« 
9. Conditions Of Adoption Orders 
In making an Adoption Order, the Court .may impose such conditions 
as it thinks fit, and .may in particular:-
(a) require the adopter to secure financial provision for the 
child; or 
(b) order that the child remains w:'i-th the jurisdiction of the 
Court for two years or less; or 
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(c) require v^ te adopter to accept supervision by and advice 
from an adoption society for two years.or less; or 
(d) where consent has been conditional on religious 
upbringing, require compliance with that condition; and 
(e) require the adopter to furnish security for due performance 
of any conditions imposed by the Court. (see section 7(2)). 
10. Interim Adoption Orders 
10.1. In any case of doubt as to suitability of the applicant 
or the interests of the child, the Court may, subject to compliance with 
all the requirements stated by paragraphs 4,5 and 6 above, make an Interim 
Order for the applicant to have custody of the child for any probationary 
period not exceeding two years, on such conditions as regards .maintenance, 
education, and supervision as it thinks fit (see section 8). 
10.2. An Interim Order has no effect as an Adoption Order 
(see section 8 ( 4 ) ) . 
11. Registration Of Adoption Orders. 
Part III of the Act provides for registration of Adoptions, with 
substitution of Adoption Certificates for Birth Certificates; but those 
.matters are of .more interest to the Registrar-General and Adoption 
Societies than to practising lawyers. 
12. Effect Of Adoption Orders 
12.1. An Adoption Order transfers from the parents or guardians 
of the child to its adopters permanently all rights and obligations of 
parenthood (see section 16). 
12.2., For all purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
the adopter under an Adoption Order becomes the parent of the child, and 
vice versa (see section 1 7 ) . 
12.3. Also, for all purposes of intestate succession, or 
any disposition of property whether by will or inter vivos, an Adoption 
Order .makes the child a child of the adopter (see sections 19 and 20). 
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12.4. An Adoption Order does not, however, alter the 
nationality of the child (there being no legal provisions as yet to that 
effect). 
12.5. Adoption Orders .made in other countries of the Common-
wealth are recognised, if having substantially the same effect as our 
Adoption Act (see section 2l). 
13. Jurisdiction 
13.1. A Resident Magistrate has jurisdiction to .make an 
Adoption Order where all necessary consents have been given, and where the 
Order does not require to be justified by proof of special circumstances 
(as to which, see paragraph 5.3. above) (see section 3A(l)). 
13.2. Otherwise only the High Court has jurisdiction (see 
definition of "the courf'by section 2(l)), and cases before a Resident 
Magistrate in which there is a question either of dispensing with consent 
or of special circumstances as above have to be referred to the High Court 
(see section 3A(2)). 
14. Procedure. 
14.1. Applications for Adoption Orders are made by way of 
originating Summons, served on all persons whose consent is required by 
the Act, and on any Adoption Society which has arranged the adoption 
(see Rule 4 of the Adoption Rules 1972, as amended in 1978). 
14.2. Application .must then be .made for appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, to safeguard the interests of the child (see section 
12A and Rule 8A). 
14.3. All proceedings are in Chambers (see section 3 ( 4 ) ) . 
14.4. Officers of Adoption Societies are empowered to conduct 
applications, but without reward (see section 3(5((. 
14.5. Other .matters of procedure are governed by the Adoption 
Rules 1972 as amended in 1978. 
15. Adoption Societies 
51.1. Part V of the Act provides for approval of Adoption 
Societies (see section 2 3 ) , and prohibits the arrangement of adoptions 
by any local authority or other body of persons which is not approved as 
such (see section 22(l)), 
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15.2, The Minister is empowered also by Order to prohibit 
arrangement of adoptions by individuals other than parent or guardian of 
the child concerned (see section 22(2)), though no such Order has yet 
been made. 
15.3. Other provisions of this Part regulate the functions 
and responsibilities of Adoption Societies. 
16. Miscellaneous Provisions 
16.1. All dealings with adoptions are strictly confidential 
(see section 28). 
16.2. Payments to anyone in relation to the arrangement of 
an adoption (with very limited exceptions), and all advertisements in any 
way relating thereto, are prohibited and made punishable as offences 
(see sections 29, 30 and 31). 
17. Customary Adoptions 
The Minister is empowered by Order to exempt tribal customs from 
the application of the Act (see section 36), but no such Order has yet 
been made. 
18. Regulations 
In addition to the Adoption Rul.es, there are Adoption Regulations 
made under the Act, mainly for the guidance of Adoption Societies. These 
are in the process of revision at the present time, consequent upon the 
Amendment Act of 1978 and recommendations by the Report of the Commission 
(see paragraph 3.3. above)„ 
19. G-eneral 
19.1. This is based on the assumption that legal, practitioners 
attending the Seminar will be interested mainly in the -underlying purpose 
of our law of Adoption, and in the law as it now stands. 
19.2 Anyone who is interested also in discussion of the reasons 
for any particular provision of the present Act is invited to study the 
Report of the Commission (see paragraph 3.3. above); which, to the best of 
my knowledge, is still available from the Government Printer at the price 
of Shs.6/-
19.3. Nevertheless, I shall be happy to discuss with the Seminar any 
suggested improvements of this law. 
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SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS OK 0BPHAMS AND ADOPTION LAW, 
Rapporteur: S.B.O, GUT TO 
The author treated the seminar to a wealth of background 
information as he was the Chairman of the Commission on Adoption of 1974 
whose recommendations were drafted and enacted into law in the Adoption 
Act, 1978. In preparing its Report, the Commission gathered and considered 
information from the public through questionnaires and on-spot interviews 
particularly in the rural areas.. 
The Commission found as fact that in the EXTENDED PAMILY 
institution which predominated in traditional society, issues of orphans 
were almost irrelevant since children were deemed to belong to and assumed 
rights within the family and its material conditions. This, unfortunately 
is changing fast and has done so in .many families. In the rural areas in 
particular the interviewees rejected the .modern concept of adoption as 
symbolising buying and selling of children. This view is based on the 
aforementioned traditional social structure. 
There existed in traditional society, however, certain instances 
of what approximates the .modern concept of adoption. Por example, during 
wars when the victors permanently took care of women and children of the 
lossers and absorbed them. Also evidence was given that the Kipsigis 
sometimes abandoned their children by leaving them along the Kisii borders 
whereupon the latter would take them and "adopt" them. This practice has 
now ceased. 
The nature of the 1978 changes in the law were limited. The 
.most significant was the changes that made procedures simpler by giving 
magistrates jurisdiction to hear and determine adoption cases as opposed to 
the earlier law when only the High Court had such juritdiotion* 
The Seminar noted that generally there is anomaly in adoption 
procedures since there is high demand than actual supply of children for 
adoption while at the same time there exist alot of children that require 
and are waiting to be adopted. Some of the explanations for this include 
(a) the strictness in legal procedural requirements before orders of 
adoption can be awarded, and (b) the expenses involved in searching for 
children's background and origin. 
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It was noted that infertility is a serious problem in Kenya 
as some statistics collected afew years ago indicated that almost -gmillion 
out of 3.2 million women within the productive age were considered infertile. 
A good number of males are also infertile. Female infertility is further 
exaggerate by the fact that some are "voluntarily" infertile-—'meaning that 
in some social circumstances a woman who has not given birth to a child 
of a particular sex especially male, is considered infertile. It was noted, 
however, that a good number of infertile women who visit the Kenyatta 
Hospital's Special Clinic are receptive to p o s s i b i l i t i e s of adopting children 
The World Health Organisation is trying to help in the treatment of 
infertility in Kenya and this will be operational soon. 
The seminar noted that the provisions in the law that 
descriminate against single males-, polygyneous families, and persons of 
different race from the child in adoption cases seem to be bases more on 
prejudice than reality and ought to be reviewed. 
Whereas the Constitutional provision that does not give an 
adopted child automatic citizenship of the adoptor parent helps in not 
imposing citizenship on a child it also works to restrain acceptance and 
assimilation of the child. It is a controversial provision that requires 
a review. 
The seminar suggested that ways ought to be deviced whereby 
children could be fostered until such a time that they were grown enough 
to decide for themselves whether they prefer to be adopted or not although 
this has the problems of restraining relations between the intending adop-
ting parents and the orphan child should the child decide not to be adopted. 
The seminar could not agree on whether or not children ought 
to be told that they are adopted children. The current practice is in 
favour of disclosure. 
The seminar further noted that physically handicaped children 
are adopted but not as readily as the others. It was also noted that 
few adoptors require that the children they want to adopt should be of 
the same ethnic group or to resemble them. 
- 65. - IDS/OP 35 
LEGAL ASPECTS OP CHILDREN'S: HOMES AMD INSTITUTIONS. 
By 
M.M. Akola, 
Children's Department, 
Ministry of Home Affairs. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The number of Children's homes and institutions today in the 
republic total 106. Of these, five are established by local authorities 
and the rest by societies and voluntary institutions. 
In practice, any local authority or society, can establish a 
children's home or institutions without the necessity for legal clearance. 
All the above said children's homes and institutions began in this way. 
It is possible that even at this time we are discussing this subject, 
a new children's home is coming up somewhere in some part of the Republic. 
Need for Legal Clearance. 
There are advantages in this practice. Naturally societies 
and any voluntary organizations would want to make decisions and immediately 
act on them without having to consult lawyers or legal institutions. In 
this way desperately needy children get support readily as no time is 
wasted in legal consultation. 
On the other hand should it happen that the institution or 
Children's home is established without due regard to the provision of 
adequate life requirements e.g. enough accommodation, food etc., then it 
becomes a big problem to close it as no alternative place renders itself 
readily available to the children already in the home. There are a number 
of children's homes presenting such problems to-day. 
Provisions of legal clearance before an organization starts 
to establish a children's home; I feel would be a welcome solution. 
Establishment. 
It should not be concluded, however, that there is no legal 
check on the establishment and running of children's homes. The Children 
and Young Persons Act, (Cap. 141) as you may well know, makes provision 
for the protection and discipline of children, juvenile and young persons, 
and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith. 
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The children's homes and institutions cater for all needy-
children who require care, protection and in .many cases discipline. 
Education and training are provided in preparation of the children for a 
better and gainful adult life. Part III (Section 22) of the Act, defines 
the children and Juveniles who .may be identified as being in need of 
protection or discipline. 
Appointment of local Authorities. Part VIII of the Act, Section 58 (l) 
provides for the appointment of Local authorities, either individually 
or jointly as an Appointed Local Authority for the purposes of promoting 
the welfare of needy children, juveniles and young persons in its area of 
jurisdiction. This Appointment, which leads to registration and gazettement 
under the Act, confers to the particular local authority legal powers in 
operating welfare and social services schemes. 
nurseries and children's homes. Provision is also .made for employment of 
children's officers to handle .matters pertaining to the welfare of the 
needy children. 
Out of a total of 65 local authorities in the Republic, only 
the following have been appointed. Of these, only 5...have established 
a total of 5 children's homes. 
Owing to lack of field personnel, it is not possible to say how 
.many day-care centres or nursery schools have been established by these 
authorities. As for children's officers, a total of 24 have been employed. 
These schemes are given in the second schedule in the Act as 
RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE. 
MUNICIPALITIES COUNTY COUNCILS TOWN',COUNCILS . 
NIL County Council of Kipsigis NIL 
Cbunty Council of Pokot 
County Council of Narok 
Ei '.'TERN PROVINCE. 
Municipal C. of Embu C< unty Council of Embu 
Municipal C. of Meru, County Council of Isiolo 
County Council of Kitui 
County Council of Masaku 
County Council of Marsabit 
County Council of Meru, 
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MUNICIPALITIES COUNTY COUNCILS TOWN COUNCILS. 
WESTERN PROVINCE. 
County Council of Bungoma 
County Council of Kakamega. 
County Council of Busia. 
Municipal Council of 
Thika County Council of Kirinyaga 
County Council of Murang'a 
County Council of Nyandarua 
NYANZA PROVINCE. 
Municipal Council of 
Kisumu County Council of Gusli Kisii Town C. 
County Council of Kisumu 
County Council of South 
Nyanza 
County Council of Siaya 
COAST PROVINCE. 
Municipal Council of Mombasa 
Mombasa. County Council of Kilifi. 
County Council of Kwale. 
County Council of Lamu. 
County Council of Taita 
Taveta 
NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE, 
County Council of Garissa, 
County Council of Mandera. 
County Council of Wajir. 
NAIROBI AREA. 
City Council of Nairobi 
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Approved Societies. Section 63 of the Act provides for approval of 
any society or voluntary institutions working for the care, protection 
or control of children, juveniles and young persons. Any such society 
or voluntary institutions may establish institutions or children's homes 
for the care of such persons as .may be committed to their care under the 
Act. 
However, -under the same section, no more children or 
juveniles may be committed to the care of the society or voluntary 
institution once a notice to surrender or withdraw the certificate of 
approval has been served. 
Records in the Children's Department show that a total of 33 
societies and voluntary institutions have been approved and registered 
under the Act. The list is given below. More than 90$ of the children's 
homes and institutions are established, .managed and run by approved 
societies. 
Approved Officers:- Many social/welfare and manial workers are employed 
by these approved societies either as filed staff of residential staff 
in children's homes and institutions. 
Section 64 of the Act provides for the appointment and gazettement of 
some of these social/welfare workers as approved officers. The appointment 
and gazettement empowers these officers to process needy children's cases 
through law courtsV So far 8 approved societies have had 24 appointed 
and gazetted approved officers and obviously play; an important 
Samaritan role. 
Voluntary Societies 
1. The Child Welfare Society of Kenya 
2. Dr. Barnardo's Homes in Kenya 
3. Edelvale Trust, Kenya 
4. The Society of Deaf Children 
5. Kenya Society for the Blind 
6. The Save the Children Pund, Kenya 
7. Salvation Army 
8. The Pranciscan Sisters of Oudenbosch 
9. The Church Missionary Society 
10. The Red Cross Society (Kenya) 
11. The Kisumu Diocess of the Mill Hill Catholic Mission 
12. The Presbyterian Church of East Africa 
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Voluntary Societies Cont: 
13. The arya Pratinidhi Sabha, East Africa 
14. The Diocese of Nairobi in the Church Province of E.Africa 
15. The Diocese of Kisii, Mill Hill Catholic Mission 
16. The Diocese of Nakuru in the Church Province of E . Africa 
17. The African Inland Mission 
18. The Young Muslim Association 
19. Diocese of Kitui 
20. Diocese of Maseno North in the church province of Kenya 
21. The Kenya Society for Mentally Handicapped 
22; The Kenya Women Organisation 
23. National Christian Council of Kenya 
24. The Institute for Rural Development 
25. Diocese of Meru 
26. Christian Children's Fund Inc. 
27. Testimony Faith Homes 
28. Islamic Charitable Services ltd 
29. The Islamic Foundation 
30. Diocese of Nyeri 
31. Consolata Sisters 
32. S.O.S. Children's Village, Kenya 
33. Undugu Society of Kenya 
Registration, 
By the provisions of legal Notice No.289/1965, all children's 
homes and other children's institutions are required to be registered. 
The penalty for failure to do so is a fine not exceeding two thousand 
shillings. Happily for those concerned, the children's Department so 
far has not taken any one to court under these provisions although many 
children's homes and institutions remain unregistered. One reason why 
the Department has not taken such nasty action is attributable to lack of 
personnel to inspect and take action. However, the second reason which 
is more important, is that the Department attached .more important to 
negotiations co-operation with all organizations involved in this voluntary 
and yet very important service to our needy children. This second reason 
accounts for the good results so far achieved in the voluntary services to 
both our needy young and old. 
According to records, the undermentioned children's homes and 
Institutions have been registered under the Act. A total of 34 institutions 
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remain unregistered, although under Section 76 of the Act, these 
institutions ought to be compulsorily registered. However, as stated earlier, 
shortage of personnel is the reason why the registration exercise, is 
perforce slow. 
Children's Homes. 
1. Dagoretti Children's Centre 
2. Edelvale Home 
3. Dr. Barnardo's Home 
4. Salvations Army 
5. Salvation Army Joytown 
6. St. Oda School for the Blind 
7. Rangala Catholic Orphanage 
8. Hyang'oma Catholic School for the Deaf 
9. Mumias Catholic School for the Deaf 
10. Egoji (St. Lucy's) School for the Blind 
11. Salvation Army Training School for Girl's 
12. Catholic Children's Home 
13. Starehe Boy's Centre 
14. John P. Kennedy Memorial School for Crippled Children 
15. Jacaranda School for Mentally Handicapped Children 
16. Salvation Army Kabete Children's Home 
17. Mama Hgina Hostel 
18. Salvation Army School for the Blind Kibos 
19. Children's Orthopaedie Catholic Bohra Road. 
20. Child Welfare Society Embu Home for children 
21. Port Tudor place of Safety 
22. P.C.E.A. Kambui School for Deaf 
23. Meru Children's Home 
24. Thika Children's Home 
25. Tumutumu Deaf & Dumb Unit 
26 Tuuru Home for Children 
27. Kakamega Children's Home 
28. Machakos Children's Home 
29. Dayanand Children's Home Nairobi 
30. Kandara Children's Home 
31. Githiga Children's Home 
32. Karatina Children's Home 
33. Caltex Children's Home 
34. lady Horthey C. Home 
35. The Save the Children Fund 
36. Madunguni Children's Home 
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Children's Homes Conti: 
37. Charles Lwang'a House Port Tudor 
38. Amani Cheshire Home 
39. Ngala School for Deaf 
40. Salvation Army School for Blind Likoni 
41. Kapsabet School for the Deaf 
42. Nakuru Boy's Centre 
43. Salvation Army Sec. School for the Blind 
45. C.C.M. School for the Deaf Murang'a 
46. Kaaga School for Deaf 
47. Garissa Boy's Town Private Bag 
48. Mama Ngina Kenyatta Children's Home 
49. Got Kokech Orphanage 
50. Garissa Muslim Home 
51. Kandunyi Children's Centre 
52. Kigumo Children's Centre - Murang'a 
53. Maseno School for the Deaf 
54. Port Reitz School for Handicapped 
55. Garbatulla Girl's Home 
56. C.C.M. Children's Home 
57. Merti Boy's Home 
58. Girl's Town Wajir 
59. Osaro Self-Help 
60. Nyandarua School for the Deaf 
61. Kwale School for Deaf 
62. Kipchimchim Home for Cripples 
63. S.OoS. Children's Village 
64. Mugura Children's Home 
65. Testimoney House 
66. Al-Parah Children's Home 
67. 01-Kalou for Physically Disabled 
68. Kerugoya School for the Deaf 
69. Kibarani Lions School for the Deaf Children 
70. Kizito Children's Home 
71. Mandera Boys Town 
72. C.M. Homecraft Training for girls. 
Management: 
A children's home is an institution and as you very well know 
such ft care institution is not wholesome for the normal rearing of a child * 
However, since institutional care becomes necessary when family or foster 
care cannot be provided, great care has to be taken to make sure that life 
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in the institution is as near as family one as possible. To achieve 
this, provision is made under Section 76 of the Act for the formulation 
of regulations as to the,; management and administration of the approved 
societies and voluntary institutions in relation to the care of children 
in the homes and institutions. The full text is contained in the 
Legal Notice No. 268/1965. 
To ensure good quality services to children placed. :in any 
type of care, adequate funds and trained personnel are a must. Unfortu-
nately our Country, like many other developing countries, cannot afford 
these requirements adequately in all the institutions. 
Some voluntary organizations are wealthier than others and can 
afford the best for the children placed in their care. In many cases, 
their field and residential staff attend refresher courses and training 
programmes abroad. There is, however, dire need for locally established 
training programmes in this country for both field and residential 
childeare workers. This need is felt even in statutory corrective 
institutions like approved schools. 
CHILDREN'S DEPARTMENT. 
The children's Department is charged with the day to day 
administration of the Children and Young Persons Act. The Department 
co-ordinates all the legal aspects of all bodies and institutions for 
children's services. It processes all appointments, registrations 
gazzettements, said above and operates statistical aspects and inspections/ 
supervisory responsibilities in relation to the care, protection, control, 
discipline, education and training of the needy children. 
Statutory Children's Institutions:-
There are two types of statutory institutions managed and run 
by the Department. These are Juvenile Remand Homes and Approved Schools. 
Juvenile Remand Homes are Established under Section 36 of the 
Act. They offer safety and custody to Juvenile remands awaiting for 
disposal action by the courts. There are nine of these Institutions at 
present and they are:-
NAIROBI NAKURU MOMBASA 
KIAMBU KAKAMEGA NYERI 
MURANG'A KISUMU ELDORET 
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SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS ON-LEGAL ASPECTS OP CHILDREN'S HOMES. 
Rapporteur: SHEM ONG'ONDO 
Following a lengthy and learned discussion of the paper the 
Seminar .made the following Recommendations; 
1. That as far as possible, children should be encourage 
to grow in their own homes. This,<it was thought would 
only be possible if peoples standards of living were 
improved.. 
2:.' That discipline ' which is part and parcel of a good citizen 
should be instiled in the children whether at home or in 
the children homes. 
3. That parents who .make their children needy should be 
subjected to some form of punishment- subject, of course, 
to Reco.mmedation 1, above. 
4. That in light of the fact that children's officers have 
very little power to prosecute, and in light of the 
limitation by Section 23 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act, as to who .may be prosecuted, this Section should be 
amended by deleting the words "....Custody, charge or care.;." 
and,- further, that the children's department be readily 
given legal advise if possible, a qualified lawyer be attached 
to this department. 
5. That in order to realize Recommendation Pour above, wider 
investigative powers carried out by a specialized person 
for this purpose, be given to the children's department. 
6. That in order to ensure effective governmental control 
on the establishment of children homes, there should be 
prior consent before the establishment of these homes. 
7. That offences against children be consolidated in one statute. 
8. That the public be involved .more in reporting of abuses 
against children and other cases. 
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LAW GOVERNING- THE EMPLOYMENT OP CHILDREN IN KENYi 
By 
P.K. Ng'ang'a 
A Graduate of Faculty of Law 
University of Nairobi (1979) 
IWTROPTJCTIOff 
This paper is an abstract and a summary of a dissertation compiled 
and submitted by the present writer for his LL.B degree (1979). The 
dissertation."Infant contractual capacity and protection by the Law: A 
special study into contracts of employment," analyses the concept of 
contractual capacity, traces this concept into employment contracts and 
then looks at the employment legislation affecting children in Kenya. 
The underlying theme of the dissertation is the special position 
accorded to children in every human society. The nature of children is 
such that they depend on the adult .members of the society for both their 
.material and non-material needs. Child welfare has been considered to be 
a .most important consideration which amy human society should have towards 
its very young. The concept of contractual capacity and the employment 
Legislation in Kenya has therefore been looked at as against this test. 
Porblem Areas 
The writer has certain factual situation in mind: 
(i) Many children, .mainly female, employed as domestic servants. 
This is particularly so in the urban areas but to a lesser 
extent in the rural areas. 
(ii) Many children, mainly .male employed as "Matatu"conductors . 
(iii) Many children who work in coffee, pyrethrum and tea 
plantations. 
(iv) Many other children employed to do other .miscellaneous 
activities e.g. shoeshine boys, waiters in hotels, in 
timber pit-saws, dance troupes etc. 
The Present Law 
This is contained in the Employment Act (Cap.226 Laws.of Kenya) and 
the Subsidiary Legislation .made thereunder. Legal Notice No.155 of 1977^ 
has rules that are relevant to the situation under consideration. Situations 
falling within the ambit of the Industrial Training Act (Cap. 237 Laws of 
Kenya) are not within the ambit of this paper. 
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The Employment Act 
The Act defines a juvenile as meaning a child or a young 
person. A child means an individual, male or female who has not attained 
the age of 16 years. A young persons is an individual, male or female 
who has attained the age of 16 years but has not attained the age of 
18 years. 
Section 24 of the Act defined "Industrial Undertaking" and makes provisions 
regulating child employment in such undertakings. 
Section 2 5 expressly prohibits employment of children in Industrial 
undertakings but has a proviso with regard to children so employed -under 
the Industrial Training Act. Under Section 26 a child can only be 
employed under a verbal contract of service. Under Section 27 no child 
can be employed to attend on any machinery or in any open cast workings 
or sub-surface working which are entered by means of a shaft or adit. 
Section 28 prohibits the employment of juveniles between the hours of 6.30 
p.m. and 6.30 a.m. in any industrial undertaking. Under certain 
circumstances, a male young person may be employed between these hours. 
Under Section 28 (2), notwithstanding the above provisions, the minister 
may, after consultation with the board authorise an employer in writing 
to employ young persons up to the hour of midnight or from the hour 
of 5.00 a.m. 
Under Section 29, Section 28 may be waived when public interest demands it. 
Section 31 requires an employer employing a juvenile to keep and maintain 
a register containing such .matters as the age and date of birth of the 
juvenile, date of entry into and leaving such employment and such other 
matters as may be prescribed. 
Section 34 gives the labour Officers extensive powers. Such officer may, 
by notice in writing served upon the employer, not only prohibit a person 
from employing a juvenile but may also terminate or cancel any contract 
of service so entered with a juvenile. Section 35 If any person knowingly 
employs a juvenile in any industrial undertaking in contravention of the 
provisions of the law, he would be guilty of an offence andl.liable to a 
fine. Section 50 of the Act gives an authorised officer power to initiate 
proceedings and to take into custody and return to the parents or guardian 
any child employed contrary to part (iv) of the Act. 
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Employment (Children Rules 1977 (L.N. 155 of 1977) 
The Minister for labour, pursuant to the powers given to him 
under Section 56 (l) of the Employment Act made the Employment (Children) 
Rules 1977o 
These rules apply to any type of employment except employment as 
an apprentice or an indentured learner. Under rule 3, no person shall 
employ any child without the prior written permission of an authorised 
officer. The permission cannot be granted where the child has to stay away 
from his parents or guardian unless such parent or guardian consents in 
writing. The authorised officer cannot grant the permission where the 
child is to be employed in any bar, hotel, restaurant or club -unless the 
labour Commissioner has consented in writing and the child is in possession 
of a copy of such consent. Every permit issued -under this rule .must be 
renewed annually and failure to comply with this rule is an offence. 
Rule 4 provides that every person authorised to employ more than 1.0 
children on permanent basis shall designate a person to be responsible for 
the welfare of the children. Such a person .must be approved in writing 
by the Labour Commissioner. Upon conviction forinon-compliance with these 
rules, a person is liable to a fine not exceeding K8ha-.4j00Q, The Coaiion 
law rules governing contracts of service in which infants are parties 
will also apply. 
Observations .made on the .Present law. 
It is submitted that the Employment Act is limited in scope in 
the sense that it mainly deals with the employment of children in Industrial 
undertakings. The Law contained therein has the effect of interfering 
with the freedom of infants who .might wish to go into such employment. In 
other undertakings which are non-industrial, the employment rules will apply. 
It is submitted that the rules are only procedural. The law should stipulate 
the specific rights and duties of an infant in a service contract. 
It is also submitted that the formalities and procedures the 
employer is required to follow are largely disregarded by the employers and 
unknown to the infant employees. 
It is submitted that the only justification for the intervention 
by the "state" into the employment contracts entered into with infants is 
to protect infants from any exploitation by the adult .members of the 
society who .might wish to avail themselves of cheap child labour. 
— / o — 1UU/ vAt J j 
It is also submitted that the law as we have it today has become 
ineffective and does not contain the situation. The law must be made 
to cope with the situation in a better way. 
Before any recommendations are .made, the above submissions 
will be expounded a little. Although Section 24(2) of the Employment Act 
has a definition of "Industrial Undertaking" which is quite wide, the 
Act does not concern itself very much with non-industrial undertakings. 
Obviously, there are many sectors of our economy in which children could 
be employed such as in undertakings which are agricultural in nature. 
Section 24 (2)(d) defines "Industrial Undertaking" to include 
inter alia, transport of passengers or goods by road, rail or inland 
waterway. Thid definition is important as it covers an area in which 
.many children are being employed today, namely as "Matatu" conductors. 
Section 24 has two provisions which have the effect of narrowing down even 
further the operation of the law in this field of Industrial Undertakings. 
Firstly, the .minister responsible for labour matters, "if he sees fit 
so to do, having regard to the nature of the work involved in any 
employment carried on in any industrial undertaking .may by order declare 
that such employment shall be excluded for the purposes of the provisions 
of this part, and therefore such employment shall be deemed not to be 
employment in Industrial Undertakings for the purposes of this part. 
"Secondly", any undertaking of which a part only is an Industrial Under-
taking shall not for that reason alone be deemed to be an Industrial 
Undertaking. These provisions were deliberately included to allow for 
any policies which the government .might wish to implement."'' This was 
expressly stated when the Bill was being debated in 1948. T^e proviso 
excluding partly Industrial Undertakings should be seen in light of two 
factors. The first is the government policy. It was the policy of the 
colonial government to make the economy of the Kenya colony self-supporting 
2 
This economy was primarily based on agriculture. The second is the 
exclusion of agricultural undertaking from the provisions of the law. 
Infants had to be available to work legally in factories that processed 3 
raw agricultural materials at the coffee and sisal estates. These 
provisions must be seen in light of Section 25 particularly which prohibits 
employment of children in any industrial Section 27 and 28 also take 
the form of prohibiting the employment 
1. legislative Council Debates 1 9 4 7 / 4 8 at p.434 per Mr. Vasey. (M.C. 
433 per Mr. Hyde Clarke (M.EE.) 
2. For our understanding of the col.policy. 
- N. leys "Kenya" ( 1 9 2 4 ) 
- W. Mcgreggar Ross, "Kenya from within" 
- Marjorie Ruth Dilley, "British Policy in Kenya Colony 
3. - legislative Council Debates 1933 vol.1 - p.42. 
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of children in certain areas and in certain times. Sections 34 and 
50 gives the Labour Officers wide powers to interfere with contracts of 
employment entered into with juveniles. The effect of these provisions 
is to interfere with the independence and capacity of infants as citizens. 
The (children) Employment Rules are, unlike the Act, wide in 
4 
scope. However these rules are only procedural. A prospective employer 
is required to conform to the laid down procedure before he can employ a 
child such as the permission of an Authorised Officer. Even when read 
together with the common law rules, still the law should spell out the 
substantive rights and duties of an infant in any contract of service. In 
the research which""the writer of this paper did, labour officials were 
interviewed. Personal interviews were conducted with the Deputy labour 
Commissioner, and two provincial Labour Officials. The indications were that 
there is no way in which "the labour personnel can control the situation. 
The interviews indicated that may children are employed in .many places where 
in the absence of co-operation of the adult employers of children it would 
be impossible to enforce the law. It is also clear that even the children 
employees are not very cooperative. The number of children in employment 
is a large one. The conditions under which they work is exploitative. 
Children employed as 'Matatu' conductors for example have to do with 2/= 
per day, which some employers claim is compensated by lunch, provided by 
the employer. The same case applies with respect to 'Ayahs'. They also 
get about 2/= Per day which is said to be compensated by provided 
accomodation and .meals. This is clear to any person who knows the Kenyan 5 
Society today. This has also been the subject in the local newspapers, 
also over the radio of late, probably because in 1979 children welfare has 
been the concern of the Kenyan and the International Community. It is 
clear that the law is either disregarded deliberately or unknown to many 
people, especially the children. The Labour personnel also indicated the 
difficulty in its enforcement. There is therefore a need to increase the 
number of personnel dealing with child labour. As has been alluded to above 
the interference into the childs capacity to enter into industrial under-
takings has not been solely for the benefit of the child. When Section 25 
4. Employment (Children) Rules 1977 - L.N. No.155 of 1977 . See Rule.2 
5. Newspapers -"The standard" - April 13th 1978; April 14th 1978; 
March wnd 1979; July 11th 1979 (p.9). 
"Daily Nation" Sept.15th 1978 (p.5) Radio - "The Way It is" 
Programme - 2 7/28/july 1979. 
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is read together with Section 24, it reveals a very half-hearted spirit 
regarding the protection of children from dangerous employment. This is 
when these sections are seen in light of their historical origins. 
However, in independent Kenya, the powers of the minister could be 
exercised for the benefit of infants in some cases. An argument can be 
advanced therefore that the .minister .may exercise his powers under the 
proviso and exclude "Matatu" conductors from the provisions of the part, 
therefore putting such employment in the category of non-industrial 
undertakings. It is however submitted that this would not solve the 
problem. In this case, the employment rules which are ineffective and 
inadequate would apply. 
Section 28 is another illustration of the half-hearted approach 
towards safeguarding the welfare of children who go into employment. The 
provisions of the section are subject to considerations of public policy 
and convenience or expendiency more so for .male young persons. The 
history of these provisions was that children had to be .made to work at 
night in the coffee factories during the rush season®^ The law has the 
effect of reducing the capacity of children especially with respect to 
Industrial Undertakings, It is however apparent that when the law does 
allow the child to enter into some of these undertakings it has been for 
two reasons. This has been to legalise the employment of children in 
certain essential sectors of the economy. Secondly, a need to prohibit 
the employment of children in other sectors on humanitarian considerations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The capacity to enter into employment contracts which is given 
to an infant under the Kenyan Law has been governed by considerations not 
solely in the interest of the infant. This is because the substance of 
our law regulating the employment of children is incompatible with a true 
spirit of protecting the infants. The Law as it is does infact restrict 
the independence and capacity of infants as citizens. The Law has had to 
consider the two needs of safeguarding the interests of children and the 
interests of other individuals. The interests of others has had the upper 
hand. It is, therefore, recommended that no child or young person should, 
in any way be restricted in his or her capacity or independence as a 
citizen solely or largely for the benefit of any other person or persons. 
It is acknowledged that the present law adopts a good position with 
6. 1956 Bills - Memo of objects and Reasons' P. 16. 
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regard to the employment of children. This is because at a certain 
stage in their growth, the best place that children can spend their time 
is in school while in the absence of parents or other family members. 
It is submitted that this is an ideal position. The reality is that there 
are many children neither in school nor with their family .members at home 
This class of children have to be employed so as to earn a living. It is 
these children who should be allowed to work. This is in the absence of 
a better alternative which has not been available so far. The question 
then does arise. Is the present legal position assisting them in any way? 
It is submitted that the law should assist these children even .more. The 
child should be able to enter a binding contract with his employer. 
Children and young person should be protected by legal incapacity to act 
independently. Children should be free from having attributed to them any 
legal responsibilities likely to be unduly burdens©m§ to a person of that 
age. 
The powers given to the labour Officer under Section 34 interfere 
with the child's independence. However the labour Officer should be .made 
a party to the contract the infant enters into. This should be solely on 
the grounds of public policy. 
As shown above, the Employment Act is narrow in scope and a large 
area does exist where the law is silent and the rules which govern such 
areas are .mainly procedural. Regarding the rights acquired and obligations 
under the contract, there should be basic terms in the contract employment. 
There have to be presumed in all cases of child employment. These terms 
should be substantially for the benefit of the infant and should include:-
- That the infant has completed a .minimum standard of education 
which should be compulsory. 
- A minimum wage payable to any child. The wage payable to any 
child would however vary depending on the nature of the work, 
the type of job and the circumstances of each case. 
- The contract will contain a term that the infant can leave 
the employment any time he wishes. Any disputes that could 
arise on such a child leaving the work would be settled on 
equitable principles. 
It is also recommended that the child should also be availed of 
legal counsel at the expense of the state as a matter of right. This will 
.mean that the Labour Officer or other authorised officer together with a 
State Counsel can take up an issue to court asserting the child's rights. 
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SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS ON - EMPLOYMENT OP CHILDREN 
Rapporteur - MR. A.G. RINGERA 
The seminar was aware of a conflict between the principle of 
State intervention in contracts of employment entered into with children 
in the interests of the child and the common realization that children 
are part of the free citizenry of Kenya who were indeed capable of much 
work. It was accepted that the overriding principle should be State non-
inteerference in children's contractual capacity unless it was obvious 
that their physical and/or moral health would be in jeopardy. That apart, 
it was felt to be in the interest of children to reform the Employment 
Act and Regulations pertaining to the subject matter with a view to making 
it .mandatory for all contracts of employment to be in writing, open to 
the superintendence of a labour official and clearly spelling out the 
level of education a child should have attained to be employable, his 
minimum wage and the terms on which he can terminate the contract. 
. The seminar also felt that there should be made available free 
legal assistance to all children on matters arising in the course of or 
out of the employment relationship. It was also suggested that children 
should have as of right certain hours or days off duty to indulge in 
formal education, self-education and recreation. 
At a broader level the seminar felt that it was necessary on 
the part of the authorities to consider the causes of children wanting 
to be employed. If the fault lies with inadequate provision of necessities 
of life in the child's home, that should be tackled by the state through 
making facilities to ensure that every family have a shelter and something 
to eat. No concrete suggestions were made in that respect. 
- 83. - IDS/OP 35 
JUVENILE DELIQTIENCY AND THE LAW 
By ' 
Mrs. Ruth Sitati 
Resident Magistrate 
Nairobi 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
T 's year, 1979 is the International Y^ar. of the Child and already 
alot has been said about this topic uri g the first half of this year. 
So far what has been said about the International Year „f t e Child • 'nts 
to the fact that parents and the community as a whole have grea^' "p n-
sibility of ensuring that the children in their .midst live in a healthy 
environment for their proper development, in all respects. We are all 
aware of the fact that a child who grows up in an unhealthy environment 
will usually grow up without any sense of direction or responsibility. 
1.2. CAUSES OE JUVENILE BELINQUENCY 
At tie m-ntion of the words "juvenile delinquency" .most people 
will at once cast their minds at the streets of Nairobi and other towns, 
and will see the dirty looking boys who scavenge the street, and eat from 
dustbins. To a large extent this is a correct picture of what the 
juvenile delinquent is, but one has to remember that there are nany 
juvenile delinquents who do n^t frequent th^ streets. These are the 
delinquents ba;k in the villag s to whom the hand of the law does not r . . 
A exampl that fits such a . ituation exists in Bungoma Distri t, especially 
close to the bord r ' ° the Chepkule era hrs left its indent y'ng mark. 
During that period, many children, particularly boys left ool ^11 in 
the name of smuggling.' Now that the period is over, these children who 
have been reduced to nothing, do not wish to return to school, and most of 
u parents have got no idea whatsoever of what to do with the children. To 
co.me to the point, the following are some of the causes of juvenile . 
delinquency:-
a) Poor Home Life 
Though it is not uncommon to find anti-social, children among some 
f the c ildren f'.'om well-to-do homes it is generally accepted that m~st 
juvenile -j.ol:".n?uents come from poor homes. In most of these hom 
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education whether of a formal or an informal nature is completely-
lacking, and there is also a complete lack of both moral and spiritual 
guidance from the parent(s). 
From my experience in the Juvenile Court, this factor of poor 
hpme conditions contributes quite a great deal to criminal or difficult 
behaviour in children. Most of the cases in the Juvenile Court which are 
usually probed into by probation officers, reveal that juvenile offenders 
come from broken homes where either parent, usually the mother is left 
solely responsible for the everyday upkeep and upbringing of the children. 
In many of the cases, the mother has no formal employment and has to 
resort to other means, including prostitution, to earn whatever cents they 
can earn for the family's bread, the mother thus ends up having no time 
to get involved with the children, the children therefore have to find 
their own way of solving their problems, which include finding meals 
for the day. This kind of problem, coupled with the ever increasing 
strains of urbanization makes the problem of juvenile delinquency a 
pressing one, calling each one to play our part. 
b) Child Born Out of Wedlock 
Most of such children are born either of school gipls or unmarried 
mothers whose chances of marriage are minimal. In-the rural areas, such 
children are left in the care of their aged or ageing grandparents who in 
the long run are not able to properly care for the children. In the few 
cases where the children are 'lucky' to be recognized by their putative 
fathers, they are taken to live with their stepmothers. Such cases rarely 
end on a happy note for the children where the incidence of child beating 
is very high. In this area, the abolition of the Affiliation Act has 
helped to make the situation very bad. It is heartening, therefore, to 
hear that the Hon. Attorney General, Charles Njonjo, is seriously 
considering the re-introduction of the Act. 
c) Over Indulgence in Children From well-to-do Homes It is a 
fact that in homes where children are made to take material things as a 
substitute for love, quite a few of such children end up being delinquents. 
I dealt with quite a few cases of this nature, and most parents seem to 
be at a loss as to what could be the cause of such a situation. 
1.3. LAWS RELATING TO CHILDREN 
a) The Children and Young Parents Act (Cap. 141, Laws of Kenya) 
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Enacted, in 1963 and designed specifically to make provision for the 
protection and discipline of children, juveniles and young persons. 
Section 3 of the Act provides for the establishment of Juvenile 
Courts to deal with juvenile offenders and delinquent parents. Parents 
who neglect their children can be summoned to appear before the Court. 
The Act provides that children may be brought before the 
Court i ,. it is established or suspected that they are:-
a) neglected 
b) not under proper control by their parents or guardians 
c) living in an environment which is detrimental to their 
physical or moral well-being 
d) over 18 years old and therefore criminally responsible 
for any acts or ommissions 
It is worthy of note that the rest of the children who appear 
before the Court for the first time will normally appear again for a 
second, third and even fourth time. This shows, as I have stated earlier, 
that somewhere along the line of development parents fail to do their 
job. Once the case is before the Court, it is the Court's duty to find 
the most appropriate punishment for the offender, the guiding principle 
in this respect is that it is the welfare of the child which should be 
given paramount consideration, so that the Court is empowered to take steps 
remove a child from undesirable surroundings and for securing that proper 
provisions made for its maintenance, education and training. 
Depending on the nature of the case, and after considering all the 
circumstances surrounding a case, a Juvenile Court may order that: 
i) the child be handed back to the parents or guardians and 
may require the parents or guardians to enter into a recognizance that the 
child will be well looked after. 
ii) the child be committed into the care of a fit person 
iii) the child be committed to an approved school where the 
child is over ten years old 
iv) the child be committed to a Borstal... Institution or Youth 
Corrective Training Centre. 
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I wish to mention in passing that most of the facilities 
recommended by the Act are in short supply and sometimes a court's good 
intentions to do the best for the child never work. I also wish to 
mention that though it is easy to have the law on paper, it is another 
thing to enforce it. Most parents are very uncooperative when they 
discover that their children have been involved with the law. Quite a 
few of them are happy to have their children taken away from their homes, 
and even encourage their children to do wrong, so that somebody, they 
will find their way to an Approved School. 
a) The Employment of ffomen, Young Persons and Children Act Cap 277 
Designed to regulate the employment of women, children and young persons. 
Section 17 of that Act is important in that it prohibits the employment 
of the under thirteen year olds in circumstances which are calculated 
or are likely to cause or do cause such a child to stay away from home. 
I attach a lot of importance to this section because we are all aware of what 
happens in reality and we as participants of this workshop share the 
blame with everybody else. It is an open secret that in our midst there 
are seven year old girls employed as ayahs. The question of child labour 
is a touchy one. One of the papers will however deal directly with this. 
c) The Adoption Act. Cap 145. 
This has been dealt with adequately by Mr. Slade and I have 
no wish to say any more on it. 
1.4 SOME COMMON CASES THAT COME BEFORE THE COURT 
a) Thefts, (b) Assaults - child Vs and parent/guardian Vs child 
c) Drug trafficking especially in bhang (d). Vagrancy. 
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Though the law regarding- the protection and discipline of 
children exists, it is only in rare cases that a case .may reach the 
appropriate authorities. The parent/guardian may be ignorant of the law 
and the child who may be a victim is ignorant of its rights. There are 
only limited facilities and a desperate lack of personnel so that the 
Probation Officers, Childrens Officers and the Child Welfare Society of 
Kenya re not able to cope with the demand for their services. In addition 
to this is the problem of uncooperative parents or guardians. 
In the case of ayahs who may be victims of ill treatment their 
positions call for sympathy. Ayahs are forced to earn a living due to 
the harsh economic conditions in their own homes, they not only need the 
job but they are very ignorant of their rights. 
Some people have suggested that in order for the law to be more 
effectively felt, there must be an increase of the sentence provided by 
the law. My own feeling is that increasing the fines or custodial 
sentence as far as parents are concerned may not be very helpful, I feel 
that this would only increase the burden of the state, more so in the 
face of the scarce resources available to put these children on a proper 
footing. Harsher custodial sentences would separate the parents from the 
children and this has not only got harmful psychological effects on the 
child, but also increases the burden of the state for looking often a 
greater number of inmates. 
What I think is required is an improvement in the whole of the 
socio-economic set-up of this country, Parents need more education on 
ways and means of earning a living that would ensure good health for their 
children, More important there is great need for a total revitalization 
of both personal or public morality which have collapsed in the face of 
the present present economic order. 
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SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND THE LAW 
Rapporteur: S.B.O. GUTTO. 
The discussions that followed generally agreed with the author's 
observations and stressed that delinquency is not so .much caused by 
hereditary problems as they are by social conditions. The following 
suggestions-cum-recprnmendations were made: 
a) That .more probation services should be provided, 
b) That increasing of approved schools for delinquents is not 
necessarily good for the society as they may well become 
a permanent normative feature of society,. 
c) Since there see.ms to be only one known study done in 
evaluating the treatment meted to children in borstal 
institutions, it is necessary that proper studies be done 
on this subject since it was the impression of the seminar 
that many children from borstals .move on to crimes and 
then jails, 
d) Usually there is a tendency among some societies to create 
.more institutions for the care of delinquents but this 
should be discouraged in Kenya in favour of .more welfare 
workers and probation officers, 
e) There is need for probation officers and welfare workers 
to co-ordinate their work, 
f) There should be a system of .material assistance to the 
poor families since alot of children suffer without 
necessarily being technically delinquents - e.g. parking 
boys and girls. 
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MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OP OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN 
By 
Dr (Mrs) Miriam K Were, 
Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Community Health, 
University of Nairobi. 
and 
Fred Ojiambo, 
Advocate. 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper an attempt has been .made to highlight some of 
the glaring offences against children as well as practices which unless 
curbed, would inevitably have injurious effects on children. The 
objective is to provoke discussion on this subject which 'is the only 
way by which better ideas and more workable .methods of bringing them 
into fruition will be arrived at. 
The paper is in two .main parts. The first part is a 
presentation of some >f offences and their health implications. The 
second part deals with the legal aspects of offences against children. 
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PART I; INTRODUCTION 
Health Implications of some offences against Children 
Definition: Applies to first part only. 
Offence: Is used in this part to imply a practice that is 
injurious to health. 
Child: This term is used here to include the period from conception 
to the legal status of adulthood. Por the purpose of this 
presentation, the period of Childhood is subdivided into 
four parts thus: 
1. The Child in utero 
2. The Young Child This includes infancy 
to Pre-school. 
5. The School Age Child This period includes 
the period from about six years to the 
peripubertal period. 
4. The Adolescent Youngster 
The commonest offences of each age group will be presented and their 
health implications discussed. 
1. THE UNBORN CHILD 
Events that take place from conception to birth are of profound 
consequence to the development of the unborn child in utero, and sub-
sequently on the child after birth and on the adult. Practices that are 
likely to be injurious to the unborn child include the following:-
91 IDS/OP 35 
(a) Indescriminate Ingestion of drugs by expectant .mothers 
That drugs can be tetragenic was poignantly if tragically 
brought to the surface with the cases of thalodomide and the limbless 
children born to mothers who used this drug at a certain stage in their 
pregnancy.* The practice of ingestion of tetragenic drugs in this country 
may be due to 
(i) Small print presentation of the warning not to prescribe 
a drug during pregnancy which is easily missed by an undesigning 
prescriber. The problem becomes bigger when newer drugs fill the market 
and memory of what was learnt as harmful in pregnancy may no longer be 
applicable. To ingest a drug during pregnancy which should not be ingested 
by an expectant mother is an offence against the child. 
There are, of course, the rare situation where the only hope of 
saving a mother's life may be by use of a drug that could harm the unborn 
child. But this is a case in which not only the mother but also the 
unborn child may lose their lives. This situation need not be used to c -
encourage indescriminate prescription of drugs. Public awareness on this 
matter is of the greatest importance. 
(ii-) Self-prescription by patient or family may result in 
ingestion of harmful drugs. The patient or family may be so familiar with 
what usually helps the patient that the same thing is bought regardless of 
existence of a pregnancy. This is sometimes done by a patient in protest 
against "poor care" by a doctor who has not prescribed drugs. It implies 
a breakdown in communication or a foolhardy state of mind for which the 
•unborn child .may pay a very dear price. 
(iii) Traditional medicinal herbs: Whether some of these herbs 
could harm the unborn child is not known since many of these herbs still 
have to be studied scientifically. One sees herbs used extensively by 
rural, populations and, it is said, herbs are equally used by city dwellers-
although not as much in the open. The whole question of appropriate 
dosage for traditional remedies is yet to be resolved. The fact that 
their effects on an unborn child are unknown makes the need for investigating 
them even more urgent. 
(b) Habits 
Cigarette smoking is one of the best documented variables as being 
harmful to the health of the individual with extensive effects on the 
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respiratory, cardio-vascular and other systems. It has also been 
shown to be one of the important variables that negatively affect the 
growth of the child in utero in the "small-for dates" children who are 
small due to some stunting effect on their growth resulting in below 
average sizes at birth. The stunting probably goes beyond the pysical 
to the mental spheres. 
Excessive alcohol by an expectant mother has also been found 
to be harmful to the growing foetus. 
The adult individual may consciously decide to ignore the 
helath risks and continue to indulge in these habits. But if that a dult 
is an mother, then her rights are impinging on the rights of the unborn-
child. In terms of possible injury that could be effected in the child 
these habits are offences. 
Habits, such as excessive alcoholic intake are said to be 
indulged in as response to emotional strain. In communal living within 
traditional villages the need of the expectant mother for her husband's 
emotional support was probably less crucial Zthan in the hostile urban 
setting. The indulgence of an expectant mother should therefore be seen 
to reflect the type of relationships existing in homes and need to be 
of concern to both the expectant mother and her spouse. 
(c) Good' Hutriti6nfel:: statute . ' 
While good nutrition is important throughout pregnancy 
particularly the protein component, it is very important in the last 
three months which is the period of the fastest brain growth. In many 
traditional culture, .many protein foods are taboos during pregnancy and 
even where there are no taboos the very familiar stories of "Nyama ya 
Kuchoma at the bar" often implies that the expectant mother and her 
children do not benefit from these meat-roasting sprees. A spouse could 
therefore injure the •unborn child by failing to provide or assist in 
providing sufficient proteins during pregnancy. 
(d) The health of the mother 
A growing foetus is said to be "a very successful parasite" 
in that it will continue to prosper even in rather debilitated individuals. 
There is however a limit. A .mother who has got syphillis and other 
veneral diseases, a .mother who has severe medical condition which is 
unattended to may deliver a baby who has been offended against by herself, 
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her family or her society at large. A practice that seems quite common 
in some parts which has harmful effects on the child is wife-beating. 
Where wife-beating is rampant consideration is not often .made of the 
presence of a pregnancy. This .may result in bleeding and even loss of 
the foetus. Pew .more offensive practices exist that is .more serious 
than this one both to the .mother and the unborn child. 
2. THE" f'O'UI-TG CfilLD 
(a) Nutritional status 
(i) Inadequate^/unbalanced diets In infancy and young 
childhood good balanced feeding is probably the .most crucial factor with 
respect to the growth and development of the infant and the young child. 
Failure to provide a good nutritional base is therefore one of the .major 
offences against children. A Nutrition Survey done in 1977 by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (then in the Ministry of Finance and Planning) 
brings out the rather grim fact that there was only "about 2% in 
a community (in Kenya).without any Protein Energy Malnutrition". This 
rather grim figure is even .more grim with realization that poor nutritional 
status in childhood has been found to be associated with low resistance 
to infection and high death rates from diseases not connected with high 
death rates in the well nourished child. These have also been association 
wi^h poor mental development, poor school performance and so on. 
(ii) Introduction of Potentially dangerous Feeding Practices-:-
Bottle feeding without the facilities of refrigeration and a very high 
standard of hygiene; is no longer a .matter of dispute with respect to 
its health hazzards. These dangers of bottle-feeding without the proper 
understanding and facilities for appropriate care have been the subject 
of .many books and films pointing out that this is a leading cause of 
• / 
death, usually through infective diarrhoea and vomiting - the number one 
killer in .most developing countries. And yet one continues to see the 
glorification of and the pushing of this .mode of feeding even in the 
very poor urban settings and rural areas. Glorifying practices that lead 
to high .morbidity and .mortality is surely an offence against the health 
and life of the victim. 
(b) The Care of the Child during the day 
It is well known that in traditional settings every- young 
children help.look after their younger sibblings. This, however, is 
within a network of communual. living and responsibility such that 
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somewhere in the background or close by there is an adult, perhaps a 
grandmother who oversees everything. Within the continuing breakdown of 
the co.mmunual life, .mutual supportiveness that existed is dwindling fast. 
In the old days mothers worked mostly in farmlands close to the home 
and the times of going and returning home were regulated by family needs. 
A lactating woman was not expected to dig for as long as the non-lactating 
one and so on. But with entry of .mothers into the formal employment 
sector, the time of leaving and returning home is controlled by external 
forces. A .mother can only stay home on a "hunch" that something is not 
quite right with her baby at the risk of losing her job. There was a 
time when getting a responsible ayah was easier than it is nowadays. To 
get a responsible ayah one needs to be in a position to pay rather well. 
And there are not .many of them around. And yet in .most families the mother 
needs to work to help supplement the family income. Moreover there are 
certain public sectors notably teaching and nursing, which would .more or 
less co.me to a halt if .married women were withdrawn from work voluntarily 
or by force. This would also tend to perpertuate the descriminating 
practices against educating girls if they were not seen to contribute to 
the national efforct by supporting these service area. It would appear 
therefore, that the answer would not be simply to say "A woman's' place 
is in the house with her children". 
The fact of the matter is that in this period of transition 
between different roles and occupation by women, the care of young children 
is in danger of being left in limbo. And yet child care and rearing are 
so important not only for proper physical development but also for proper 
emotional and .mental development and adjustment. It seems to .me that it 
is an offence against the proper development of the child when the care 
of that child is left uncatered for adequately. This lack of provision 
of care usually goes with unsupervised playing areas or lack of any 
facility or grounds for playing, an important factor in a child's development. 
(c) Protection against preventable diseases 
This paper has already touched on the devasting effects both 
in morbidity and .mortality, of diarrhoea in developing countries. Most 
f diarrhoea can be prevented. 
There is a group of diseases for which prevention is possible 
by immunization. This includes diseases such as measles, whooping cough, 
tetanias, and polin. Measles and whooping cough are ,TSSpo®JMevl©r a Te-rj 
large percentage of death among infants and young children. They continue 
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to be killers and. polio continue to main long after vaccines are .made 
available for their prevention. Infants and children cannot take 
themselves to health facilities in order to benefit from this protection. 
Is it not an offence to the health of hildren when we do not get them 
to benefit from this existing knowledge? 
3. THE SCHOOL-AGE CHILD 
It is generally stated that in developing countries, children 
under 5 (who form about 20% of the total population) contribute more than 
50$ to the .mortality. The picture is made even more grim by the reali-
zation that of all children born in developing --c-ountries a high percentage 
die before attaining school age. 
So when discussing the school-age child we are discussing the 
"tough ones" that have .made it through the critical period and who, with 
a little help, would probably .make it all the way. But even for those 
children the road is far from rosy when it is realized that -
Only a small proportion of them enter school long enough to be 
functionally literate, 
That even of those who do stay in school long enough lack of 
basic supportive facilities hinder them from optimum utilization 
of these facilities. Many school children go to school without 
any breakfast. 
And .many of those parents who do give breakfast have sub-
stitutes too - which has no food value—unlike porridge, especially 
millet porridge, which is more nutritious. Many children are too 
far from school to go home for lunch. And most of those who do 
go home or maK<§ ah effort at gettihg lunchj on$ finds, end'up 
havi-hg "water f or .;luhch" „ Thfe Lack of a schopl lunch policy 
.makes1.the situation .more critical. 
One could further say that lack of school or community 
libraries close to children does not help them make .maximum use of their 
school days if they are at school. But perhaps that seems like a-far 
fetched issue. One could, however, say if the children who are at school 
were supported by a good nutritional policy, good.environmental sanitation 
and good health that they would probably perform better even in the limited 
offerings that some rural schools provide. 
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4. THE ADOLESCENT YOUNGSTER 
At the best of times and with all kinds of support, the 
adolescent period is known to be one of the most tumultuous. In a country 
like ours the adolescent's problems are compounded by the fact that the 
majority of this population are "no where" in that; with the existing 
bottle-neck to high school entry, many of the youngsters who were in 
Primary Schools find themselves, to use the expression of one of them, 
"thrown out and floating to nowhere". They find themselves suddenly 
unplaced in life. 
But the "Silent (and often violent) majority" never did go to 
school for any length of time. They may not feel thrown out and floating 
to nowhere but rather, "forever" kept out and down. Exclusion from 
school, even if due to circumstances rather than intention, has many 
effects on youngsters. Only two will be touched upon here: 
(a) Lack of Education on the body and its development 
In the traditional communal life that is fast vanishing 
initiation into adulthood through gradual teaching by grandparents and 
other elders was dramatically brought to a climax by the specific 
initiation rites such as circurnscision,This teaching by grandparents 
is almost non-existent in most communities in Kenya with the development 
towards unclear families. Even where rites such as circumscision are 
still done, a common practice is that these are done much earlier (usually 
before the baby leaves the hospital after delivery) and does not go hand 
in hand with the teaching. Asked about this most parents say, "their 
children learn these things at school". 
Even if school teaching touches on matters relating to body 
development, sex and family life, a large section that does not go to 
school is left out of any such teaching. And for those who do go to 
school, there are questions as to how adequately sex education is carried 
out. 
Lack of planned information on sex, sexual relationships and 
their consequences leaves many young people at the mercy of their impulses, 
often with costly consequences, particularly to the female youngsters 
and the children they bring into the world. Is it not an offence against 
the young when society leaves them in limbo on such crucial matter?. 
> 
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(b) Employment 
The right to employment is one of the basic human rights in 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Without an education .many youngsters 
are handicapped even before they start. Even with those who do go to 
school the step wise reduction of those who continue with education 
beyond seven years leaves many youngesters without any planned occupation 
or employment. 
lack of planned occupation often leads youngsters to such 
habits as excessive alcoholic intake, drugs and violence. it not an 
offence against these youngsters when there are no planned occupations 
for them as they enter adulthood? 
5. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE POR THE OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN? 
Who is responsible for offences against an unborn child? 
The usual response one gets is that it is, of course the .mother. 
But is it? 
And who is responsible for the poor nutrition, lack of immunization, 
absence of safe play grounds? Who is responsible for the offence of the 
daily starvation of children who are in the process of trying to learn? 
And who is responsible for the lack of adequate preparation of youngsters 
with the .minimum essential knowledge about themselves? 
There are areas in which the responsibility falls squarely on 
each of the parents. There are areas in which responsibility falls on 
the entire family. 
In yet other areas responsibility falls squarely on the larger 
society, the community and beyond that, the entire nation. 
The areas of responsibilities .need to be delineated and the 
requirements of each specified. Mechanisms for assisting in seeing that 
these responsibilities are being carried out need to be established.. 
And perhaps penalties for failing to carry out certain basic responsi-
bilities need to be worked out. In some countries it is unlawful to keep 
a child out of school. In others it is unlawful to have a child remain 
unimmunized against certain diseases by a certain age. 
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The legal profession is historically to be the profession that 
clarifies, and delineates issues. And perhaps it is the law society that 
will help this country set the limit as to what can be considered 
"voluntary" provision of basic rights of the child and what is to be 
considered "not so voluntary". Offences against the health of the child 
jeopardize the very life, the continuance and the quality not only of 
the child but the adult that the child becomes. 
6. COMMUNITY PUBLIC EDUCATION 
While the legal details are being discussed and streamlined, 
it is important that the general public be informed on these and other 
topics of direct importance to them. Por in the final analysis the 
decision of whether or not to act rests with the individuals. Acting as 
an individual in a traditional setting can be very difficult. This brings 
us1 to the importance of involving communities as a whole and improving 
situations with people's participation. The "learned professors" need to 
step out of their academic/high class settings and get down to the people. 
This is a responsibility that professions like law and .medicine cannot 
afford to side step. 
PART 2: THE LEGAL ASPECT 
The protection of children and other young persons from neglect, 
ill-treatment or abuse is a subject which is as important and complex 
as it is.of great concern for the law. And this, it is felt, is as it 
ought to be particularly because when we speak of children and othpr young 
persons we are in fact, speaking about over half of the Kenyan population. 
Furthermore, and perhaps .more important, we are speaking about the section 
of population which, owing to its youth with the concommitant physical 
and intellectual insufficiencies, is susceptible to a wide range abuse. 
Due to their gullibility, children are open to gui _e and deceit by 
unscrupulous adults. Because of their physical and&mental weakness they 
can easily be subjected to bodily abuse. Yet, the task of trying to .make 
legal provisions wide enough to cover the ever-increasing number of ways 
in which abuse to and of children can be achieved does not cease to be 
enormous and complex.• 
At all events, there exists a body of law directed at protecting 
children and/or combatting the incidence of abuses. What seems necessary 
is to see that the provisions of these laws are carried out and that where 
they fall short of what is needed, amendments or new provisions be 
enacted to enhance the protection of young persons. 
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A duty to support and maintain minor children is universally 
recognized as resting upon parents of such children. Usually such duty 
rests on the father primarily, but partially or entirely upon the .mother, 
ynder some circumstances or pursuant to some statutes. The parental 
duty is said to be principle of natural law, and is everywhere acknow-
ledged as at least a moral obligation of parents towards their-
children for having brought them into being. Although arising out of 
the fact of their relationship, that parental duty may be rested also 
upon the interest of the state as parents patrae of the children 
and of the community at large in preventing the children from becoming 
a public burden. It is, therefore, essential to the welfare of the 
state that children and other young persons be fed, lodged and educated, 
and also that the state shall not be unnecessarily burdened with their 
care, and is therefore a duty not only to the parents themselves but 
also to the public as well. The duty is at once a legal one and natural 
obligation, the consistent enforcement of which is equally assential 
to the well-being of the state, the morals of the community and the 
development of the individual. And, because of this very fact, this 
duty extends beyond just the parents and guardians and attached also to 
those who have assumed a relation in loco parentis . 
Protection and Discipline of Children 
The Principal enactment aimed at the protection and discipline 
of children and young persons is the Children and Young Persons Act 
(CAP 141) of the laws of Kenya (Hereinafter called 'the Children's Act). 
This Act amongst other things, provides for the setting up of juvenile 
courts for the purpose of hearing all charges against persons -under 
eighteen years of age, except in cases ,/where they are charged jointly 
with any person or persons over the age of 18 years, and for the purpose 
of exercising any other jurisdiction conferred on them by or under 
the Act or any other written law. It also provides for establishment 
of approved schools and for the constituting of approved societies 
working ofor the care, protection or control of children, juveniles 
and young persons. It further provides for the appointment of appointed 
local authorities to make welfare schemes for persons under 18 years 
of age, and for the care of children and young persons currently under 
charge and for their supervision by inspectors appointed for the purpose. 
The following discussions will, however, centre mainly on Part III of 
the Act, which deals with the protection or discipline of children and 
juveniles, and on Section 23 in particular. 
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Section 23 of the Children's Act provides for the penalty for 
cruelty to and neglecting children or juveniles. The section provides 
inter alia as follows:- * 
Section 23. (l) If any person who has the custody, charge or care of 
any child or juvenile -
(a) Wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or 
exposes him or causes or permits to be assaulted, ill-
treated, neglected, abondoned or exposed in any .manner 
likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to 
health (including injury to or loss of sight, hearing, 
limb or organ of body, and any .mental derangement) or 
(b) by any act or omission, knowingly or wilfully causes that 
child or juvenile to become, or conduces to his becoming 
in need of protection or discipline, he shall be guilty of 
an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand 
shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
.months or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
Provided that the court, at any time in the course 
of proceedings for an offence under this sub-section, .may 
direct that the person charged shall be charged with and .tried 
for an offence under the Penal Code, if the court is of 
the opinion that the acts or omissions of the persons 
charged are of a serious aggravated nature. 
The Problems of Definitions 
In order for Section 23 to become operative two elements 
.must be shown. The first is that there is a person who has custody, 
charge or care of another. Secondly, that the other person is a child 
or juvenile. 
Section 21 of the Act sets out the circumstances under 
which any person is said to have charge or care of a child or juvenile. 
Any person who is the parent or guardian of a child or juvenile or who 
is legally liable to .maintain him is deemed to have care of that -child 
or juvenile". So is any person to whose charge a child oj? juvenile is 
committed by any person who has the custody of him'. Similarly, where 
any person has actual possession or control of a child or juvenile-, or 
where any person employs a child or juvenile who is not resident with his 
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parent or guardian, such a person will be deemed to have care of that 
child or juvenile. 
It is clear that this provision not only covers parents and 
guardians but also persons who stant in loco parentis. A person is 
usually said to stand in loco parentis when he or she puts himself in the 
situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligation incidental to the 
parental relation without going through the formalities necessary for 
a legal adoption. It is submitted that can include total strangers to 
the child or juvenile, provided such a person has actual or constructive 
possession or control of a child or juvenile in such circumstances as 
would morally oblige him to take responsibility for such child or juvenile. 
It is not clear why the protection -under Part III of the Act is 
extended only to the persons under 16 years of age. It is suggested, 
however, that perhaps the guiding principle here was that young persons 
under 16 years of age, in contradistinction with those above that age but 
less than 18 years of age, are more likely to exhibit the disabilities of 
infancy and consequently .more often than not to need greater protection 
from acts of their own improvidence as well as from acts of others. It is 
essential to note that the state of being a 'child' or 'juvenile' is a 
status which is created by the law without necessarily having regard to 
whatever medical evidence there .may be as to 'mental' age in any given case. 
The disabilities of infancy are in fact personal privileges conferred on 
infants by law, and as such constitute limitations on the legal capacity of 
infants, not to defeat their rights but to protect them against their own 
acts and those of others. It could be argued that there may be cases in 
which a child or juvenile is definitely 'grown up' and others when a young 
person over 16 years of age needs .more protection than a juvenile, by 
virtue of being less 'grown up'. 
It is noteworthy also that although Section 2 of the Children's 
Act clearly defines the upper age limit as to can be considered a child, it 
seems open to argument at precisely .what point in. conception a foetus 
becomes a child recognized by law. This is a matter on which our 
law remains painfully silent. Yet it is a .matter whose importance can 
never be over-emphasized, especially when we talk about 'offences' against 
children. 
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Although the term 'offence' has no technical .meaning in law, 
its definition distinguishes it from a .mere civil wrong. In Section 
2 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act (CAP 2) it is defined 
as "any crime, felony, .misdemeanor or contravention or other breach of, 
or failure to comply with, any written law, for which a penalty is 
provided". More specifically, as defined in the Penal Code (CAP 63), 
an offence is "an act, attempt or omission punishable by law". Thus, the 
term 'offence' connotes any wrong which attracts punishment. It .must be 
distinguished, however, from a tort which only gives rise to a right of 
action, being a wrongful act or injury consisting in the infringement of 
a right created otherwise than by contract. The standard of proof in the 
event of a prosecution for an offence is very high, the requirement being 
that all particulars of the charge, the essential ones at any rate, .must 
be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. It follows, therefore, that 
anyone embarking on a prosecution under Section 23 of the Children's Act 
.must prove the existence of the child beyond reasonable doubt and in the 
construction of a will a posthumous child en ventre sa .mere at the time of 
the testor's death .may ordinarily be included in the term 'children' etc., 
even though, it is submitted, at the time of the testor's death the .mother 
.may not be aware of the pregnancy. In the American case of State v Atwood, 
54 Or. 526, 102 P295 it was held that, for the purposes of inheritance, 
the phrase 'person living at the death' of one .may be construed for .many 
purposes as including a child en ventre sa .mere. Similarly, an American 
court in Hornbuckle v Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E. (2nd) 727 (Ga. 1956) 
held that a plaintiff who sustained injuries while still in his monther's 
womb which caused him to be born with deformed right foot, ankle and leg 
could recover damages against the Defendant. The Plaintiff had received 
the pre-natal injuries when the Defendant drove a .motor vehicle so 
negligently that it collided into the vehicle in which the Plaintiff's 
.mother, who was then taken pregnant, was travelling occasioning the lady 
the injury that resulted in the deformity of the Plaintiff. 
It is, however, doubtful that the foregoing sense :of the 
term 'child' could be adopted in the event of a prosecution under Sectin 
23 of the Children's Act, or even provision that the section is dealing 
with children who have been born alive. Por it is difficult to conceive 
even with a stretch of the imagination, how anyone could have custody, 
charge or care of any person who is at the time in the .mother's womb. 
•There is a further difficulty which is that of proof. If the charge 
is one of, say assaulting a child when the 'person' assaulted is a person 
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en ventre sa mere the difficulty of proving legal personality of such 
assaulted person is clear. How does anyone proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that a two-day old zygote is a person? And it is precisely this 
very problem that has necessitates the distinction between the offences 
of abortion and child destruction. 
Abortion means a miscarriage, or premature expulsion of the 
contents of the womb before the term of gestation is completed. In 
law, this .means the confinement of a pregnant woman at anything short 
of the full term, that is to say, her miscarriage. Child destruction, 
on the other hand, (which in the .marginal note of Section 228 of the 
Penal Code (CAP.63) is referred to as 'killing unborn child' is an offence 
which nakaft guilty of felong any person who, when a woman is about to 
be delivered of a child, prevents the child from being born alive by any act 
or omission of such a nature that, if the child had been born alive and 
had then died, he would be deemed to have -unlawfully killed the child. 
Before any person can be convicted under that provision it .must be proved 
•that the child was capable of being born alive. If the 'child' were 
constituted in a week old pregnancy, it could easily be argued that 
whatever else it .may have been it could not have been a child; and the 
sense of that argument can well be appreciated. In England this contingency 
has been taken care of by Section 1 (2) of the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act, 1929 which provides that evidence that a woman had at any .material 
time been pregnant for a period of twenty-eight weeks or more is prima 
facie proof that she was at the time pregnant of a child capable of 
being born alive. It is submitted that the proposition would be of a 
highly persuasive authority in our courts here in the matter. Support, 
to an extent, of this view was voiced by Judge Blacks tone in the case 
of Commonwealth v Parker (Mass) 9 Met 263 when he said that "Life begins 
in contemplation of the law as soon as infant is able to stir in the 
.mother's womb". If we understand his reasoning correctly then it .means 
that, for the purposes of penal provisions at any rate, life begins, not 
when conception (i.e. the infusion into the egg by the spermatozoa) occurs, 
but much later; when the 'baby' actually starts 'kicking'. 
Specific Offences 
Having digressed in order to emphasize the necessity and 
importance of definitions in law, let us now revert back to the subject 
of offences against children. 
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It follows from the definitions given above that certain 
acts, attempts or ommissions which may be socially or morally abhorrent 
.may not amount to offences punishable under our law. An area which 
is inevitably of great concern for gynaecologists and other .medico-legal 
enthusiasts is one related to habits by pregnant women which habits may 
be harmful to foetal development. Some of these habits are the indis-
criminate ingestion of drugs, cigarette - smoking, the imbiding of alcoholic 
beverages, failure to .maintain good nutritional status, to name just a few. 
These habits are not in themselves prescribed by law and are not consequentlt 
offences. Generally speaking, therefore, anyone indulging in them is 
not thereby rendered liable to prosecution albeit that the health of the 
child _in utero .may thereby be jeopardised, unless of course the act, 
attempt or omission falls clearly .within one or .more the specified offences 
such as abortion or an attempt thereto. Por it is a principle of natural 
justice that laws be specific and not so general as to enable any act, 
attempt or omission to be included therein. 
Various legal instruments have been enacted to ensure protection 
of children against abuse and exploitation. 
Employment 
Although one of the papers herein specifically deals with child 
employment, it is appropriate to say a few words on the subject from a 
different view point. The regulation of the employment of children and 
young persons is provided for under Part IV of the Employment Act (CAP 226) 
which is headed "Employment of Women and Juveniles." This Act repealed 
the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act (CAP 227) whose 
provision have by and large been incorporated in the later statute. 
Under the provisions of this Part no child or juvenile can 
lawfully be employed whether gainfully or otherwise, in any industrial 
undertaking, except where such employment is under a deed of apprenticeship 
or indentured learnership lawfully entered into under the provisions of 
the Industrial Training Act. To od so is an offence punishable by fine 
of up to Kshs 1,000/- on the first conviction and up to Kshs 2,000/- in 
the case of a second or subsequent offence. 'Child* is defined as any 
individual, male or female, under 16 years of age. "Industrial undertaking" 
means (l) .mines, quarries, and other works for the extraction of any sub-
stance from or from under the surface of the earth (2) any factory within 
the meaning of the Factories Act; (3) the constructions, reconstructions, 
maintenance, repair, alteration or demolition of building, railway, 
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tramway, harbour, dock, pier, canai, inland waterway, road, tunnel, 
bridge, viaduct etc; (4) transport of passengers or goods by road, rail 
or inland waterway, including the handling of goods at docks, quays, 
wharves and warehouses, but excluding transport by hand. The Minister 
is empowered to declare any employment excluded from the provisions for 
the Part relating to industrial undertakings if he sees it fit so to do, 
having regard to the nature of the work involved in any employment carried 
on in any industrial undertaking. 
As a passing comment, it is sad to note that the penalty 
provided is, by .most standards, extremely lenient. One would perhaps 
have liked to see a stiffer penalty provided for, especially as there is 
doubtlessly an increase in the blatant flounting of this provision-by 
persons, more often than not, who have the financial capability to absorb 
this 'soft® punishment quite comfortably. Provision for .mandatory 
imprisonment in case of a third or subsequent offence, it is submitted 
would have been a .much .more appropriate and deterrent penalty. 
Part V of the Employment Act then goes on to .make further 
provisions relating to the employment of children and young persons. Subje 
to the provisions of the Industrial Act relating to contracts of apprentice 
ship or indentured learnership, it is an offence for any person to employ 
a child, or to cause any child, to be employed, or being the parent 
or guardian or other person having for the time being the charge of or 
control over a child, to allow such child to be employed, otherwise than 
under a verbal contract of service. This provision is presumably aimed 
at ensuring that a child is not tied down by a written contract which 
may well not be in his interests, Subject also to cases of serious 
emergency, when public interests demands it, in which cases the Minister 
empowered, by publishing a notice in the Gazette, to require otherwise, 
ho juvenile shall be employed between the hours 6;30p..mo and 6.30 a.m. in 
any industrial undertaking,, The only exception to the rule insofar as 
concerns juvenile is that in cases of emergencies which could not have been 
controlled or foreseen which interfere with the normal working of the 
industrial 'undertaking and. which are not of a periodical nature. 
However, the Minister may, after consultation with a labour 
Advisory Board - constituted pursuant to the provisions of the Act -
authorise an employer In writting to employ young persons up to the hour 
of .midnight or from the hour of 5:00 a.m. subject to such conditions as the 
Minister may determine. 
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Every employer who employs any juvenile .must keep and .maintain 
a register containing particulars of every juvenile employed: (l) the age 
or date of birth; (2) date of entry into and of leaving such employment 
and (3) such other particulars as .may be prescribed. 
An authorized officer .may require any juvenile in employment 
to be .medically examined at any time during the period of his employment. 
The Employment Act also gives wide powers to the Labour 
Officer to cancel and prohibit contracts of service (other than a deed 
of apprenticeship or indentured learnership lawfully entered into 
under the provisions of the Industrial Training Act) which have been entered 
into by juvenile and employer. The grounds for such cancellation or pro-
hibition are that, in the opinion of such officer the employer is an 
undesirable person, or the nature of the employment is dangerous or immoral, 
t • 
or is likely to be injurious to the health of such juvenile, or for 
any other cause which .may be prescribed. An employer aggrieved by the 
decision of the officer .may appeal in writing to a subordinate court of 
the first class. 
Part V of the Employment Act see.ms to o.mit a provision which 
we believe was of utmost importance in the now repealed Women, Young 
Persons and Children Act. That Act provided inter alia that it was 
unlawful for any person to employ or cause to be employed, any child 
below the age of 13 years in circumstances which are calculated or 
are likely to cause, or do cause child to reside away from his parents. 
If the child was over the age of 13 years he could be employed only in 
accordance with the terms of a permit in that behalf granted by the 
labour Officer and with the consent of an authorized officer in the 
prescribed form. In the case of a female an additional provision was that 
the parent of such a child must have given approval to an authorized of 
officer to such employment. In relation to a female child who was 
.married and was living with her husband, the expression 'parent' was 
construed as .meaning husband. Where the aforesaid consent had been given 
it could still be rescinded by the express desire of the parent for the 
return of the child. 
In our submission the additional protection that those provisions 
given to children has been taken away by their omission in the new 
Employment Act. It would appear that, as long as any child is not employed 
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in any industrial undertaking - except where permitted by law - such 
child can be employed away from his or her parents. This happens commonly 
especially with respect to 'ayahs' in the urban centres. 
One need not look for research in Nairobi to find that the 
provisions of this Act are grossly violated by a large section of the 
Kenyan population. We think it fair to say that this is in no way a 
feature that is peculiar to Nairobi only. It is common to see very small 
children, employed as conductors in 'matatus', hanging precariously at 
the back of overloaded vehicles. In recent years many press reports and • 
feature articles have besppken. the plight of infant 'ayahs' who are 
imported into urban centres from rural areas to work for their relatives 
or even for total strangers. Often they are unpaid, their employers 
occasionally remitting a certain sum to their parents at home. More 
often than not they do not take part in any negotiation regarding their 
future employment, and the fact that they ultimately do co.me to the city 
is much .more due to the glamour that the city holds them as it would for 
any rural person than any genuine desire to co.me and work. Their displeasure 
in this respect is amply demonstrated by the fact that few of them remain' 
in such employment for very long, preferring to disappear somewhere in the 
city with some man, who is painfully almost in each case married and 
with a family. Not a step of the procedure laid down in the Act is ever 
followed. When for instance, do we ever hear of a cancellation or 
prohibition of a contract by a labour Officer under the Act? 
We do not think .most people employ children or juveniles in 
deliberate disregard of the law. In our view it is often more out of 
ignorance than by design. But there is little doubt that there are some 
who do so in deliberate violation of the law. The fact that so many 
press reports on the matter have not been able to stir up the society 
into doing something about this is indicative of (l) public apathy, or 
(2) condonation by the authorities, or both. The phenomenon seems widely 
accepted for abvious identifiable economic interests. The authors of 
this paper are not aware of any one prcsecution under Section 23 of the 
Children's Act, or even the Employment Act. This is despite the fact 
that authorised officers have powers either alone or in the presence of 
any other person, wherever they have reasonable cause to believe that a 
violation of any provision of the Act is being perpetrated, to enter into 
any place at any reasonable time and examine such place or any person 
therein. 
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One other cause of the apathy .may be the apparent helplessness 
of child welfare societies which are often relegated to a position of 
'extras'. The societies do not have a big enough .membership and good 
contracts to enable the.m to influence the proper authorities, leave 
alone the legislature. Then, of course, there is always this unavoidable 
problem of insufficient manpower, coupled with the general poverty of 
the people. The enforcement of the provisions of any law ultimately 
presupposes co-operation by the public in general. This is usually 
not forthcoming, not only due to ignorance, but .mainly - in our submission 
because the parents of the children are usually impoverished rural 
people who want a little .money from the city to supplement their already 
.meagre earnings, if any. Because they are usually not able to afford school 
fees for their children, they would rather the same children started 
earning for them at an early age. As for the employers themselves, their 
reluctance to co-operate .may be out of fear of a possible prosecution. 
It is submitted however that the Act does not go far enough. 
The following could be considered:-
(a) Street Trading: Unscrupulous persons, in order to avoid the 
payment of tax, could easily recruit children to carry out street trading 
on their behalf at a small fee. It is probably a stretch of the imagination 
to say that the child .maize roasters on the streets of our .main towns do 
belong to any such organisation. But it is not naive to think that in 
the realm of organised crime this cannct be conceived. Our legislators 
should therefore provide for the prohibition of street trading for children 
except where they have been employed by their own parents - with defineable 
limitations. 
(b) Entertainment and Performances: Provisions should also be made 
for the regulations of the employment or participation of children in 
any entertainment or performance in connection with which any charge, 
whether for admission or not, is .made to any of the audience; so that any 
person who causes or procures a child or being a parent or guardian 
allows him, to take part in an entertainment in contravention of the 
provision would be guilty of an offence. There then could be a proviso 
that this could properly be done only on a licence issued for this purpose. 
And such licence .may not be issued if the net proceeds of the entertainment 
are devoted to purposes other than the private profit of the promoters. 
Further that it shall be the duty of such promoters to show that the 
premises within which the performance is taking place are not licensed for 
the sale of any intoxica^itig/llauasy, or for gambling. 
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Education. 
Under "the Education Act, 1944 of British and under similar 
statutes in other common law jurisdictions there is provision for 
compulsory education for children, which is in accord with the proposition 
by the United Nation that it is an inherent right of every person to obtain 
an education. Our Education Act (GAP 211) has no such provision, but this 
is understandable. Kenya lacks the finances and the .means to sustain 
a system in which compulsory education is provided, for if the obtention 
is compulsory, the provision of it by the state .must likewise be 
compulsory. What is more, there is far too high a demand for too few 
schools and that is a problem which the government is co.mmendably trying 
to solve. Consequently, to date in our country it is not an offence for 
anyone to omit taking a child to school. 
It is submitted here that owing to the non-co.mpulsory nature 
of education some parents, perhaps deliberately, but more often due to 
reckless over-indulgence in worldly pleasure which burn away their finances, 
fails to provide an education for their children although under normal 
circumstances they would be in a position so to do. Such cases often 
arouse sympathy from the public and possibly admonition of the parent 
concerned from relatives or cronies, but not .much .more. This contributes 
to the premature termination of the education of .many children in this 
country. 
Under section 23 of the Children's Act (quoted above) a parent 
.may be prosecuted for wilful neglect of his child but only where such 
neglect is of a .manner likely to cause such a child unnecessary suffering 
or injury to health (including injury to loss of sight, hearing or organ 
of the body, and any mental derangement', or for wilful act or omission 
causing a child or juvenile to become or conducing his becoming in need 
of protection. In other words if the result of the neglect is simply 
that a child is deprived of a chance to go to school, this section does 
not apply. 
The point seems to be emphasized by the fact that, as regards 
education, a child is said to be in need of protection under Section 
22 (f) only if he is prevented from receiving compulsory education. There 
is still doubt that Section 22 (f) is .misplaced as it marked reference 
to compulsory education in a country which the same is compulsory. It 
is submitted that an amendment to this particular provision deleting the 
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word 'compulsory' would be desirable. Likewise Section 23 ought to be 
amended to provide that wilful omission by any person to provide a 
chile in his custody, charge or care with the means to seek education 
where such .means are available would be an offence punishable under 
the section. Safegurads could always be put to ensure that the provision 
is not abused to the detriment of the parent. A proviso could be .made 
to the effect that if such parent has been unable otherwise to provide 
such education the burden shall be upon him to show that. 
Cruelty and Exposure to Danger 
Section 23 of the Children's Act (quoted above) provides a 
penalty for cruelty and neglecting children and juveniles. Cruelty here 
has the .meaning of endangering the life of the child or exposing him 
to possible bodily injury or jeopardising his health. Subsection (2) 
of the same section provides that for the purposes of the section, a 
person having custody, charge or care of a child or juvenile shall be 
deemed to have neglected him in a .manner likely to cause injury to his 
health if he has failed to provide adequate food, clothing, .medical and, 
or lodging for him. 
In .many senses this provision is a dead letter. It is hardly 
enforced and that .may be an indication either of condonation by or a 
complacent attitude of the authorities in this regard. Surely, the 
emacited, rag-dressed child ayahs in town, the child rnatatu conductors 
and .many starving children whose parents are alive and "living it up" 
.must be, at the very least, prima facie evidence that all is not well 
to warrant investigations which .may lead to a prosecution. In our sub-
mission the penalty provided is far too lenient having regard to the 
gravity of the offence. A stiffer deterrent penalty would be .more 
desirable. 
The section also .makes it an offence for any person by an act 
or omission, knowingly or wilfully to cause a child under his care to 
fall into bad associations or be exposed to .moral danger, Presumably, then, 
no offence would have been committed where the same result has been 
achieved owing to negligence, albeit unwitting, on the part of the parent. 
If that is so then the section does not provide sufficient cover to 
children who are then exposed to great .moral danger such as being able to 
attend any public bar where intoxicating liquor is sold, of buying or 
receiving any drug which .may be dangerous or habit forming, of going out 
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to beg or receive alms or inducing the giving thereof of going into 
brothels and associating with any person thereat. It would have been 
better in our submission for individual offences to be provided for 
in separate sections so as to cover all these areas. 
The selling to a person who is apparently under the age of 
sixteen years any tobacco or cigarettes ought to be .made an offence, since 
smoking has .medically been shown to be harmful. The sight of children 
smoking away with impunity, having bought the cigarettes from a shop or 
kiosk is common in Nairobi. A lower age limit of children to whom any 
intoxicating liquor could lawfully be given could be provided for. liquor 
given to very small children could endanger their health. Gambling could 
also be prescribed for children under 16 years of age. Such a provision 
could be .made so as to put the burden of disallowing entry of any infant 
into gambling premises or participating in the gambling on the licensed 
premises. Although Section 28 of the Betting, Lotteries and Gaming Act 
(Ca .131) caters for this aspect it .merely creates offences of betting 
with a young .man, employing any young person on any licensed betting 
premises, receiving or negotiating any bet through a young person or of 
sending to any young person any circular, notice advertisement, letter or 
other document relating to any betting. The section does not prohi.it 
entry into licensed betting premises by young children. And the proli-
feration of betting .machines in and around urban centres access to which 
is free and easy for children as well the existence of a national lottery 
is testimony that there is not .much seriousness in trying to protect 
the young from tlt^ sort of scourge. At best it shows a half-hearted 
attempt at protection. 
It could be argued that other statutes cater for these other 
areas and there need not be duplication. Por instance, it .may be asserted, 
protection against the corrosion of children's morals or against children, 
juveniles or young persons falling into a habit of drinking is accomplished 
by Section 30 of the Liquor Licensing Act (CAP 12l) which makes it an 
offence for any licensee under the Act to employ a person under the 
apparent age of 18 to sell, control or supervise the sale of liquor or 
to have the custody or control of liquor licensed premises. It is also 
an offence under the same section for any person knowingly to sell or 
deliver liquor, or permit it to be sold or delivered, to a person under 
the apparent age of 18. It is submitted that this provision is observed 
.more in breach than in compliance therewith. One could easily observe 
at both the 1978 and 1979 Nairobi International Shows that .many children 
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who were of the apparent age of less than 18 years were freely purchasing 
intoxicating liquor from the counters of various bars on the showground, 
the bottles would then be opened for them and they would proceed to 
consume the contents. There is little doubt that .many bars in Nairobi, 
not to .mention those in rural areas, do not discriminate as required by 
this section, and sell liquor quite freely and openly to all and sundry. 
The reaction, or rather non-reaction, of the authorities to 
the influx into the city of children who are either beggars themselves 
or pilot beggars in the streets is also evidence of the general apathy 
existing regarding this abuse. Most of these children do have parents. 
In fact, normally the parents will be found to be people who are constantly 
in a drunken stupor, or are carrying on active prostitution, and hence 
the lack of time to care for their children. 
However, by far the .most dramatized abuse to children is one 
related to sexual offences. Pages of our newspapers everyday carry 
revolting stories of rape, defilment, procuration, abduction, indecent 
assaults, of deaths resulting from abortions, .most of which events 
involve young persons. Some of these vicious attacks on young persons 
leave indelible scars on them especially due to the fact that there is 
usually a social stigma attached to the offence not only jo the offender 
but also to the one against whom the offence has been perpetrated. It 
is appreciated that the courts are doing their best in .meting out 
punishment to offenders in this respect. But it is the feeling of the 
writers that generally the sentences are far too lenient. A person who 
is found guilty of housebreaking and stealing therefrom is .more likely 
to receive a stiffer sentence than one who has defiled a twelve year 
old child, if newspaper reports are anything to go by. 
It is submitted here that in any case involving a sexual 
assault on any child the investigators should not only investigate the 
report relating to the attack. They should also carry out enquiries 
to establish whether or not sufficient protection had been given to the 
child by the person for the time being having custody, charge or care 
of such a child immediately prior to the attack. And, if it is revealed 
that no adequate care had been exercised by such person, a prosection 
under Section 23 of the Children's Act should follow. 
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FINAL THOUGHT 
As our society becomes more sophiscated and demands upon people 
multiply in a highly competitive world, time to be with our children 
and give them the care they require lessens with each day. There is 
a temptation to be out of the home at all times, busy doing this and that. 
To supplement family income both parents are often forced to take up 
employment. The break up of traditional society with its socialization 
processes and Increase in the emphasis on nuclear families coupled with 
urbanization and consmopolitanism .means that the highly cherished values 
that characterized our society are rapidly disintegrating and dissipating into 
oblivion. The hunger for housing in urban centres to accomodate a steady 
migration from rural areas and the inability to keep pace with the migration 
forces families to move into shanties some of which are built by well-to-do 
persons craving for greater profit; and those who do not end up in the 
shanties have to find some shelter in the already crowded estates. Play-
grounds, social halls, and other recreational amenities are pathetically 
few and not able to meet the great demand. 
Often times the rural people live in a forgotten world. The 
people there have to do the best they can scratching a livelihood on parched 
pieces of land and trying to raise an income from people who do not have 
any money to buy whatever is harvested and offered for sale. It is easily 
identifiable that most of the money circulates in urban centres. Yet this 
is the hostile context within which the laws enacted to combat offences 
against children must function. 
For the law to function effectively in a society the general 
populace must first be educated as to what, in general terms, the law 
is. The general level of literacy .must necessarily be ungraded for this 
purpose. There .must also be equitable distribution not only our wealth 
but means of production, having regard always to the economics of the 
exercise. There must also be a labour force of dedicated and diligent 
law enforcement officers, well, remunerated to avoid their being corrupted 
on a large scale. 
In a word, the general standard of living must be raised albeit 
within the capabilities of our economy. This means there must be a 
national ethos, a general morality: the country as a whole .must have a 
conscience. Profit must not be the sole motivating factor. Rather, a 
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concerted concern to care for each other ought to reign. Children have 
rights among which is a right for them to expect protection from harm 
from themselves and adults. Adults of this nation .must prove themselves 
worthy of the trust placed on the.m by the young folk. 
We beli'gve that there is a lot of room for improvement, and 
the law ought to be expounded to ensure greater, and .more effective 
protection of children. This is not to say that we do not have protection 
of children in the circumstances. We think that there is relatively 
reasonable protection. The problem seems to be a general apathy or 
retisence towards the diligent enforcement of the law which exist 
for such protection. Perhaps a machinery needs to be set up whereby 
if any persons has a belief, on reasonable and sufficient grounds, that 
a child is being .mistreated or is exposed to danger or cruelty such a 
person .may file a resport with the police who then should initiate-
investigations into the matter with a view to prosecuting the offender, 
if any. Reasonable protection against any proceedings in damages should 
be placed to ensure that the person who so files a report is not 
precluded from making a genuine report. Or, perhaps, better ways of 
doing this could be done. Whatever the case, what seems important now 
is to see the existing legal provisions for the protection of children 
enforced diligently. 
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SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS ON OFFENCES- AGAINST CHILDREN, 
Rapporteur. MR. A..G. ' R.LffigERA 
The Seminar discussion that followed agreed first that; for 
effective protection of children, it was imperative to spell out clearly 
what the term "child" means. It was noted that the present law indicates 
when one ceases to be a child by expiry of time but not when one should 
be deemed to have been constituted a child for the purposes of the laws 
protecting children. The seminar felt that there should be a legal 
provision indicating when a child comes into legal existence and inclined 
to the view that the moment of conception may be the operative time. 
Second, the present law was not enforced. That was particularly 
so with regard to (a) Section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 
(cap.14l),—relating to punishment of those guilty of cruelty and/or 
neglect of children, and (b) the provisions on Employment of Women, and 
Juveniles (Part IV of the Employment Act, 1976), - relating to employments, 
prohibited to children and the formalities required before engaging 
children in salaried employment. It was recommended that the above 
provisions of law should be enforced by the public officials concerned. 
Third, even if the present law was vigorously enforced there 
would be undesirable gaps due to its inadequacy. To fill such gaps the 
seminar felt that certain additions and modifications to the present laws 
were necessary. Specifically, the law should (a) prohibit street trading 
by children,(b) regulate the participation of children in entertainments 
and performances likely to corrupt their morals, (c) penalize the wilful 
omission or neglect to educate children, (d) prohibit sale of c-igarettes 
and alcohol to children under pain of severe penalties, (e) Prohibit the 
entry of children into licensed betting premises and (f) treat indecent 
violations of children's physical integrity .more severely. 
Fourth, the present laws unfortunately adopt a cons trietionist 
attitude to the term offence. Ecluded from its purview are several 
practices and omissions injurious to the .mental and physical health of 
children. Examples include habits like uninformed ingestion of drugs, 
smoking, and alcoholic indulgence by pregnant women, .malnutrition, lack of 
sound moral education in the light of biological urges etc. It was felt 
that in understanding the term child in the broad sense indicated above, 
it should be possible for the legislature to delineate what rights children 
should have under the law. Conversely, the obligations of those responsi-
ble for such malpractices and/or mal-omissions should be spelt out. 
Addressing itself to the issue of drugs specifically the seminar felt that 
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there was need for a watch-dog body to oversee the use of our society for 
drug testing, dosage determination, and distribution of all manner of 
* 
drugs. 
Last, but not least, the seminar articulated its desire for 
the state to take appropriate economic and social action to alleviate some 
of the problems which continously shadow offences against children. 
Specifically the provision of compulsory and free education, a broader 
campaign in adult education, and the general amelioration of poverty were 
considered to be imperative measures if the child is to be liberated from 
all Malpractices/Malmomissions and whether or not the child is susceptible 
to such conduct and to make the conduct an offence. Offence in this regard 
ought to be viewed both from the narrow lawyerly approach as well as 
from the wider layman's "wrongs" approach. 
